More Reasons
Why Stacy Johnson’s A Time to Embrace Should Not Be Embraced: Part
III: Science, Nature, History, and Logic
Robert A. J. Gagnon, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of New
Testament
Pittsburgh Theological
Seminary, Pittsburgh, PA 15206
© 2008
Robert A. J. Gagnon
March 2008; posted on the
web on Sept. 30, 2008
For printing use the pdf version
here
This is the third in a series of essays critiquing William
Stacy Johnson’s multiply flawed book, A Time to Embrace: Same-Gender
Relationships in Religion, Law, and Politics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
2006). The first essay, to be published in Scottish Journal of Theology,
is entitled “A Book Not to Be Embraced: A Critical Review Essay on Stacy
Johnson’s Time to Embrace” (http://robgagnon.net/articles/homosexStacyJohnsonSJT2.pdf).
The second, which has the same main title as this essay, is subtitled
“Part II: Sodom, Leviticus, and More on Jesus and Paul.”
I. Johnson’s Misrepresentation of Socio-Scientific studies
on Homosexuality
Johnson’s treatment
of socio-scientific studies shows significant instances of
misrepresentation. Here are three examples.
(1) Johnson makes
the extraordinary claim that “in [some Scandinavian] countries the
divorce rate for gays is even lower than it is for heterosexual
couples” (122, 278 n. 32; my bold). Yet when one checks out Johnson’s
references, one finds that the situation is actually the reverse:
“divorce-risk levels are considerably higher” for same-sex
registered partnerships: 50% higher for male partnerships and 150% higher
for female partnerships in just the limited time interval of 0-8/9 years.
(2) Johnson argues
that the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG) conducted by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
shows that Kinsey’s 10% figure for homosexuality in the U.S. “may
not be as far off based as it is sometimes claimed to be” (23-25).
However, properly read,
the NSFG shows a consistent pattern of
3.3-4.0 percent of those aged 18-44 self-identifying as homosexual or
bisexual, describing themselves as equally or primarily attracted to
people of the same sex, and having any same-sex partner in the previous
year. Had the NSFG included people aged 45-59 (as did the 1992 National
Health and Social Life Survey) these rates likely would have been around
2-3 percent, within a percentage point or so of the 1992 NHSLS. Add those
aged 60+ and the population rates would have dropped to 2 percent or
less—a far cry from what Johnson touts.
(3) Regarding the
effects of “gay” parenting, Johnson alleges that “there is no credible
evidence that the sexual orientation of a child’s caregiver affects the
sexual orientation of the child” (32). Johnson cites two works to
substantiate this claim: the authoritative 2001 overview of homosexual
parenting studies by two USC professors, Judith Stacey and Timothy Biblarz;
and a 1997 book by Fiona Tasker and Susan Golombok, Growing Up in a
Lesbian Family.
However, Johnson fails to tell readers that Stacey/Biblarz state a
somewhat different conclusion: “The evidence … hints that parental sexual
orientation is positively associated with the possibility that children
will be more likely to attain a similar orientation—and theory and common
sense also support such a view…. [C]hildren of lesbigay parents appear to
express a significant increase in homoeroticism.”
A more careful examination of the Tasker/Golombok study on Johnson’s part
would also have revealed higher rates of homosexual attraction among young
adults raised in a lesbian household.
To these three
examples of misrepresentation of socio-scientific evidence one can add
that Johnson sanitizes the picture of homosexual relationships by not
mentioning any of the studies that indicate disproportionately high
rates of measurable harm that attend homosexual practice. In
particular, he fails to note significantly higher rates of sexual partners
and sexually transmitted infections for homosexual males on the one hand
and both significantly lower rates of relationships lasting 10 years or
more and significantly higher rates of mental health issues especially for
homosexual females on the other hand.
These deficiencies correlate with long-known male-female differences and
reflect, to a large extent, the endemic difficulty that relationships
without a sexual complement have in moderating the extremes of, and
filling in the gaps of, a given sex. Johnson’s silence on such matters
amounts to misrepresentation of the data.
II. Johnson’s Misuse
of Sexual Orientation as a Moral Argument
On p. 20, within his
section on “Research into Sexual Orientation,” Johnson offers a succinct
explanation of his views on sexual orientation as a moral argument. Here
is the argument broken down along with its flaws:
1. Why homosexual desire is not as normal and
constitutive as heterosexual desire. According to Johnson,
same-gender sexual desire “is as normal and as much a part of a gay
person’s constitution or makeup as heterosexual desire is for others.”
There are three problems here.
First, “normal” as
used by Johnson here is an ideologically driven descriptor, not a
scientific one. Homosexual desire is not as normal as heterosexual
desire, either in terms of statistical frequency or, more importantly, in
the sense of corresponding fully to embodied structures. The anatomical
incongruity of attempts at same-sex merger not only illustrates this but
also symbolizes the full range of non-complementary features of same-sex
bonds that includes physiology and psychology. To be erotically aroused
by, and to seek merger with, what one already is as a sexual being,
maleness for maleness or femaleness for femaleness, is certainly not as
“normal” as a desire for the sex or gender that is complementary to one’s
own, maleness for femaleness and vice versa.
Second, how does
Johnson know that homosexual desire is “as much a part of gay
person’s constitution or makeup as heterosexual desire is for others” (my
emphasis)? He offers no statistical evidence (because none exists) that
persons with homosexual desire are as unlikely to develop any
heterosexual impulses as persons with heterosexual desire to develop any
homosexual impulses. He also makes no distinction between males and
females even though the very NSFG study that he loves to cite (above)
indicates that exclusive homosexuality and heterosexuality is a less
stable feature of females than of males (so can we do more to restrict
female homosexual expression?). More to the point, in terms of frequency
of incidence levels, the overwhelming proportion of people in the U.S.
identify as heterosexual, which would certainly suggest that this, and not
homosexuality, is the default position. Even by Johnson’s understanding of
the “Origins of Same-Gender Desire” (25-28), contributing factors to
homosexual development include “abnormal” prenatal hormone
levels (androgen insensitivity syndrome for males and congenital adrenal
hyperplasia for females) and a possible “skewing in the X
chromosome” (25, 27; my emphases). In this sense, too, homosexuality is
not as constitutive a feature of human development as
heterosexuality inasmuch as we don’t speak of abnormalities as
constitutive, essential, or normal to the nature of something.
Finally, by
Johnson’s reasoning we would have to describe polysexual desire (an
orientation to more than one sex partner) and pedosexual desire (an
orientation to children) similarly. For these orientations are “as normal
and as much a part of” a polysexual person’s and pedosexual person’s
constitution or makeup as monosexual and teleiosexual (adult-sexual)
“desire is for others.”
2. Why
difficulty in changing homosexual desire is not a validating factor.
Johnson adds: “Therefore, that desire cannot be easily discarded or
eliminated as though it were somehow only an incidental part of a person’s
identity.” Elsewhere he says: “If gays and lesbians do not experience
their sexual orientation as a straightforward choice, then what sense does
it make to … condem[n] them?” “If the church does not choose to condemn
people for their gay identity, why condemn them for their gay behavior?”
(54, 60).
Few people today,
myself included, would claim that homosexual desire is easily eliminated
or even likely to be all but eliminated in most cases. So what? The degree
of intensity and persistence with which particular desires are experienced
is not relevant to ascertaining the morality of a given behavior.
Polysexual impulses—sexual desires for more than one person—are common to
humanity, especially to males. They “cannot be easily discarded or
eliminated.” Nor can pedosexual desires, as any mental health clinician
who has worked with pedophiles would attest. Other behaviors that are not
normally linked to “orientations” would not be validated even if there
were strong biological influences, such as adult incest (i.e. an incest
orientation would not justify adult incest). As regards moral concerns,
Paul in Rom 7:7-25 describes sin as an impulse running through the members
of the human body, passed on by an ancestor, and never entirely within
human control. Innateness in Paul’s thinking is the usual mark of sin—not
surprisingly given his view of universal sin. Even homosexualist
scientists recognize the moral vacuity of an argument predicated on the
innateness of urges:
Despite common assertions to the contrary, evidence for biological
causation does not have clear moral, legal, or policy consequences. To
assume that it does logically requires the belief that some behavior is
non-biologically caused. We believe that this assumption is irrational
because … all behavioral differences will on some level be attributable to
differences in brain structure or process. Thus, no clear conclusions
about the morality of a behavior can be made from the mere fact of
biological causation, because all behavior is biologically caused…. Any
genes found to be involved in determining sexual orientation will likely
only confer a predisposition rather than definitively cause homosexuality
or heterosexuality.
If biological influences
impact to some degree all behaviors, then any impact that they have on
homosexual behavior must be deemed morally irrelevant.
3. Why living
out of homosexual impulses is not life-giving and healthy. Johnson
then states: “To be sure, there are all kinds of things people may feel a
desire to do that are immoral—the desire to steal, to kill, or to take
advantage of others. Yet decades of research … have made it clear that,
when gay and lesbian people live out their sexual orientation in
responsible ways, the result for them is life-giving and healthy.”
Johnson concedes the
point that innate desires include immoral impulses, though conveniently
leaving out polysexuality and pedosexuality. Yet he then illogically
carries on his argument as if the condition of innateness contributes
to the morality of some behaviors. If anything, one could argue the
precise opposite from a Christian worldview. When believers do what is
right in spite of strong impulses to the contrary, their behavior is the
more morally praiseworthy (Gal 5:13-25; Rom 8:5-17). For example, when one
follows Jesus’ command to deny oneself, take up one’s cross, and lose
one’s life for the sake of Jesus and his gospel, then one has truly
behaved in a life-giving way. “For what benefit is there for a person to
gain the whole world and (yet) experience loss of his soul/life?” (Mark
8:34-36). Paul declared, “I die each and every day” because of the
multiplicity of hardships that he willingly endured for the cause of
Christ, “always carrying around in the body the dying of Jesus” and “being
handed over to death because of Jesus” “in order that also the life of
Jesus might be manifested in our body” (1 Cor 15:30-32; 2 Cor 4:7-18;
6:4-10; 11:23-12:10). So one might better flip Johnson’s argument upside
down and say that when persons don’t live out of innate homoerotic desires
they act in ways that are “life-giving and healthy.”
If Johnson were to
counter that the same argument could be made against heterosexual desire
he would miss the point. It is not the innateness of heterosexual desire
for most persons that makes it morally acceptable to God in the context of
the covenant of marriage. Rather it is the fact that marital heterosexual
relations correspond to the God-ordained complementary structures of
maleness and femaleness. Homosexual bonds dishonor the sexual self
irrespective of the innateness of homosexual urges because of the logic of
such bonds is that each participant is only half of his or her respective
sex.
Johnson argues that
“when gay and lesbian people live out their sexual orientation in
responsible ways, the result for them is life-giving and healthy” (my
emphasis). The qualification makes the claim virtually meaningless. It
automatically excludes from consideration the disproportionately high rate
of problems that attend homosexual relations and that arise in large
measure from the absence of a true sexual complement. Almost as
meaningless is Johnson’s main clause: “the result for them is
life-giving and health” (my emphasis). The small minority of homosexual
relationships that manage to dodge significant measurable harm do
not produce something “life-giving” since the participants dishonor their
sexual selves by seeing in a sexual same a sexual counterpart to
themselves. They also violate the clear witness of God’s will in
Scripture. Rarely do consensual sexual behaviors produce harm that is both
intrinsic and measurable—certainly not adult incestuous bonds or
polyamorous bonds, nor even pedosexual relationships. Johnson’s only
recourse, then, is to base his entire claim on the biased self-perception
of the participants (“for them”).
The end result is
that Johnson’s attempt to use the innateness of same-sex attractions as a
moral argument fizzles out to nothing.
III. Is There
“Little Good News” for Persons Struggling with Same-Sex Attractions in
Complementarian Viewpoints?
Johnson contends
that “there is little good news for gay people” in the “non-affirming”
viewpoints (106). In denying them same-sex marriage it allegedly denies
them “a means of grace” (97).
These kinds of
remarks by Johnson represent nothing less than a denial of the gospel of
the crucified Christ by which power is manifested in the midst of a
cruciform life. By Johnson’s reckoning, then, there would be little good
news and little grace for anyone who experiences deprivation for the cause
of the gospel as a result of obeying Jesus’ command to “deny oneself and
take up one’s cross” and “lose one’s life” (Mark 8:34-35). Do not the
Beatitudes stress that those who will inherit the kingdom of heaven are
precisely those who live in deprivation now, a deprivation that sometimes
arises from obedience to God’s commands (Matt 5:3-12)? Do not the six
antitheses of the Sermon of the Mount (“You heard that it was said to the
ancients … but I say to you …”) increase the likelihood of personal
deprivation for many, stressing as they do the necessity of having
“righteousness that exceeds that of the scribes and the Pharisees” as a
prerequisite for entering the kingdom of heaven (Matt 5:17-48)? It must be
asked of Johnson: What is the good news and where is the grace for people
who
-
experience intense polyamorous urges on a
daily basis and deep dissatisfaction with single-partner unions?
-
never asked to experience exclusive,
strong sexual attractions for children but do?
-
struggle for their entire lives with
addictions that most people never have to struggle with?
-
suffer daily from serious disabilities
like the loss of sight or the loss of mobility below the neck?
-
live in a culture where confession of
Christ brings great persecution and suffering?
Some of life’s
deprivations arise from the infiltration of sin and death into the world,
which befall believer and unbeliever alike. Others arise from heeding a
general call to obedience to God’s commands, incumbent on all believers
but at diverse points demanding greater effort by some than by others.
Still others arise from specific calls or burdens given by God to specific
individuals. Whatever their origin, these experiences of deprivation and
difficulties are catalysts for Christ-formation, not spiritual deserts
devoid of good news and grace.
God gave Paul a
“thorn in the flesh, a messenger of Satan to batter me.”
Paul pleaded with God to put it away from him. God answered with a “no.”
If we adopted Johnson’s understanding of good news and grace, we would
have to conclude that there was no good news or grace in God’s response.
But, on the contrary, God insisted: “My grace is sufficient for you, for
my power is being perfected
in weakness” (12:7-9). This remarkable statement defines grace not as
Johnson defines it—permission to avoid hard circumstances and difficult
demands—but rather as empowerment from God to endure a “no” from God to
one’s own request for deliverance. The good news is that God’s grace is
not only “sufficient” even in difficult circumstances and demands but also
“fully actualized” in such, when believers endure with thanksgiving for
God’s bounty.
Just as the greatest
demonstration of God’s power came in Jesus’ greatest moment of weakness (1
Cor 1:18-25), so too for believers it is the endurance of difficult times,
not immediate deliverance from them or avoidance of them, that constitutes
the supreme moment of God’s power. “So I will all the more gladly boast of
my weaknesses, that the power of Christ may rest upon me. For the sake of
Christ, then, I think well of
weaknesses, insults, hardships, persecutions, and calamities; for when I
am weak, then I am strong” (2 Cor 12:9-10). Similarly Paul could tell the
Philippians: “I have learned in the circumstances I find myself to be
self-sufficient,” whether in need or in abundance, “initiated” into the
mystery that “I can do all things in/through (en) the one who
empowers me” (4:11-13). Even near-death experiences serve the purpose of
teaching us to “rely not on ourselves but on the God who raises the dead”
(2 Cor 1:9). But for Johnson, apparently, such moments of deprivation are
bereft of good news and grace.
There is no denying
that a two-sexes prerequisite for sexual relationships makes a demand that
is keenly felt by a subset of the total population. At the same time all
rules create special burdens for a particular part of a population. For
example, a rule against multiple-partner sexual bonds or against adultery
creates a special burden on persons with an intense polysexual
orientation; a rule against adult-child sex creates a special burden on
people with a pedosexual orientation; and a rule against covetousness and
theft creates a special burden on the poor.
Moreover, obedience
to such rules is not without benefits. In the case of refraining from
homosexual practice, one avoids dishonoring the sexual self that God
created as wholly male or wholly female, since homosexual unions
effectively treat the participants sexually as only half their own sex.
One also avoids the high risk of contracting a life-threatening STI (if
male) and a likelihood of persistent relational failures with their
attendant risks for mental health (problematic in both male and female
homosexual bonds, but especially the latter).
The pastor who out
of a desire to be “pastoral” gives his blessing to someone with persistent
homosexual attractions to engage in homosexual practice has unwittingly
interfered with God’s special efforts at shaping Christ in the latter and
at increasing the latter’s reliance on God’s love. Worse still, without
having the power to act as Judge to acquit, such a pastor has put that
individual at risk of not inheriting the kingdom of God, if Scripture is
to be believed (1 Cor 6:9-10). The church simply does not have the right
to change God’s foundational requirements for holy living embedded
consistently in Scripture and then guarantee that in doing so no harm will
befall the practitioners. Appealing on the Day of Judgment to Johnson’s
permission to engage in homosexual practice will be of no value in
securing an exemption before God for failing to keep God’s commands.
In addition, without
diminishing the difficulties that a male-female requirement places on some
“category 6” homosexual persons, it is far from being the greatest demand
that God’s makes of anyone. Despite the homosexualist claim of “sexual
starvation,” no one will starve from this sexual prerequisite. A high
degree of intimacy is possible in non-sexual relationships—and non-erotic
same-sex relationships should be encouraged, not eschewed, for persons
with same-sex attractions. Johnson dismisses any comparison with “a
heterosexual person who, for whatever reason, is without a marriage
partner,” contending that the latter at least “may nurture the hope of a
union the church will gladly bless” (61). Such a remark glosses over the
fact that three-quarters of all persons who experience significant
same-sex attractions will experience one or more shifts on the Kinsey
spectrum in the course of life, even apart from therapeutic intervention
(at least according to the Kinsey Institute). This means that the great
majority of such persons will experience at least some heterosexual
functioning at some point in life. But aside from that, a heterosexual
person who has “hope” of marrying but is continually disappointed may find
life harder, not easier, than a person who experiences same-sex
attractions and has soberly faced the improbability of getting married.
And there is certainly no functional difference between a
heterosexual person who has never had sexual relations, in part because of
an unwillingness to violate God’s purity demands, and a person with
exclusive same-sex attractions who abstains from sexual relations out of
obedience to God’s commands. Surely God has not withheld grace to either
party.
In short, Johnson’s
claim that a position that prohibits homosexual practice is void of good
news and grace is itself an anti-gospel stance. It presumes that the power
and grace of God can only operate in a context where God allows people to
gratify intense, innate urges to do what God expressly forbids. Against
this notion stands the image of the cross, which signals God’s earnest
efforts at crucifying “the flesh with its passions and desires,”
especially passions and desires for “sexual immorality, sexual
uncleanness, and sexual licentiousness” (porneia, akatharsia, aselgeia,
Gal 5:19, 24).
IV. Plato’s Laws
and Johnson’s Exploitation-Hedonism Argument
Let us see how
Johnson’s use of an exploitation and hedonism argument fares in comparison
to one of the most important anti-homosex texts in Greco-Roman antiquity:
Plato’s Laws. Here Plato discusses the ideal state and particularly
how the young should be educated, through a dialogue between an Athenian
stranger (who represents Plato’s views) and a Spartan named Megillus. The
objections raised by the Athenian to homosexual practice, which are
absolute,
have nothing whatever to do with issues of hedonism and exploitation, at
least as defined by Johnson and others. Rather, the Athenian objects that
nature shows homosexual practice to be wrong, in three ways.
First and foremost,
“joining with (adult) males and boys in sexual intercourse as though with
females” puts the receptive partner in the place of a female, engendering
“softness” instead of a “manly character” in the beloved “who imitates the
female.”
It also damages the character of the active partner by the loss of
self-control with respect to gratifying unnatural pleasures (836C-E,
837B-C, 636D).
Second, “the
pleasure experienced . . . when male mates with male or female with
female” is “contrary to nature” because such unions are structurally
incapable of procreation and could lead to the extinction of the human
race (636C, 838E, 841D-E).
Third, nature shows
its aversion to homosexual practice in not giving animals the desire to
engage in such behavior (636B, 836C, 840D-E).
These arguments are
appropriated and expanded by Jewish writers of Paul’s day such as Philo
and Pseudo-Phocylides so that one cannot argue that Plato is too distant
in time from the New Testament to be of relevance.
As none of these reasons for disavowing homosexual practice fit Johnson’s
main thesis, the exploitation-hedonism argument, he is obligated to
acknowledge its error and cease using it.
After being
compelled to drop the exploitation-hedonism argument, Johnson would then
have recourse only to orientation and misogyny arguments. Doubtless,
Johnson would respond that: (1) Plato’s first argument about female-like
“softness” is misogynistic (225); (2) his second argument is inconsistent
given that we don’t reject infertile heterosexual intercourse and
irrelevant given today’s overpopulation (30, 51, 137, 286 n. 60); and (3)
and his third argument is scientifically false since we are aware today of
congenitally influenced homosexuality among both animals and humans (80).
However, such a response on Johnson’s part would miss the underlying
argument that ties together Plato’s tripartite defense of a male-female
prerequisite for sexual activity; namely, that same-sex sexual bonds are
structurally incompatible because the only sexual complement to
one’s sex is the other sex, anatomically, physiologically, and
psychologically.
Against the use of a
misogyny argument, Plato’s discussion here is actually quite affirming of
women for the conventions of the day. He speaks of the sexual pleasure not
only of a male for a female but also of a female for a male as “in
accordance with nature” (636C, 836A). The Athenian also stresses the
necessity of promoting through law and other cultural inducements
marriages where “men [are] truly fond of their own wives” (839A) and where
both husband and wife are faithful to each other in lifelong monogamous
bonds of mutual love (840E).
Nor would an
orientation argument have any material impact on Plato’s overall argument
since he acknowledges both the innateness of male sexual desires for males
and the difficulty (though necessity) of mastering such pleasures (636C-D,
837B-C, 839A, 840C). In this connection one should compare Plato’s
portrait of Socrates in Symposium 216-18 and Charmides155D
as someone who learned to manage intense sexual desires for males. Plato’s
discussion of love of boys in Phaedrus 249-56 vividly illustrates
the powerful sexual temptation that confronts the philosophic lover of
boys.
Relevant too is Plato’s portrayal of Aristophanes’ myth for justifying
congenital homosexuality in Symposium 189-93. Plato does not see
“contrary to nature” as implying no innate sexual urges for the male but
rather as implying incompatibility with embodied structures (woman as the
sexual complement to man). To act “contrary to nature” is to demonstrate
an inability to control innate passions in a manner that accords with
nature’s structures.
Nor will it do to
isolate Plato’s procreation argument from his overall argument of
structural discomplementarity, since the Athenian treats infertile
homosexual unions as far worse than infertile, and even adulterous, forms
of heterosexual intercourse. The former is to be banned “entirely” whereas
the latter might be barely tolerated if attempts are made to keep such
heterosexual misbehaviors hidden (841E). Later in the first century C.E.
even Philo, who insisted that men not marry infertile women “already
proven to be so by other husbands” and commented often on the
non-procreative incapacity of homosexual relations, recognized the
difference between infertile heterosexual unions and infertile homosexual
unions.
This is even more likely to be the case for Paul, who did not stress
procreation as a requirement for marriage but rather viewed procreation
primarily in heuristic, rather than prescriptive, terms.
Adult consensual
incest provides a nice parallel case, all the more because Plato cites in
Laws sex with one’s sibling, grown child, or parent as his sole
example of how powerful cultural sanctions can effectively preclude men
“from (engaging in) sexual commerce with beautiful persons” (838A-C,
839A). As with homosexual practice, Plato’s rejection of incest obviously
is not limited to exploitative or hedonistic forms. The rejection is
absolute. Now suppose Plato had cited as the “traditional” justifications
for rejecting incest absolutely: first, that incest blurred hierarchical
boundaries;
second, that it led to complications in childbirth; and, third, that it
was not generally practiced even by animals. Suppose too that someone
today countered each one of these explicit justifications by noting, for
example, that ancient views of patriarchal dominance are no longer
applicable; that childbirth can now be readily prevented and at any rate
leaves unaffected unions where one of the family members is infertile (or
both partners are the same sex!); and that we now know that incest occurs
both among animals and, cross-culturally, among some human population
groups.
Would such a
rebuttal really get at the heart of the problem with incest for most
ancients and moderns? Probably not. The real rationale behind prohibitions
of incest and prohibitions of same-sex intercourse is often deeper and
more difficult to formulate than the explicit surface arguments used. The
reason for this is that one is touching on irreducible minimums of human
sexual ethics. Why not have sex with your mother? The answer is quite
simple: She’s your mother. Arguments about hierarchy, procreation, and the
animal kingdom identify secondary or “symptomatic” rationales for an
underlying, unstated opposition; namely, the problem of too much
structural or embodied sameness, whether on the level of familial
relations (incest) or on the level of sex or gender (same-sex
intercourse). Attempting to refute each of the surface rationales
separately does injustice to the underlying, yet often unstated, rationale
that ties the whole together.
So, for example, the
discovery that some animals participate in same-sex intercourse or in
incest does not undo the foundational point that “nature” involves not
just innate impulses but, more importantly, embodied or material
congruities. The fact that some animals and some human population groups
practice incest or, for that matter, pedophilia does not make such
behavior “natural” in the deepest sense. Similarly, one may try to dismiss
a procreation argument against homosexual unions by noting (as Johnson
repeatedly does) that we do not condemn infertile heterosexual unions,
just as one may dismiss a procreation argument against incestuous unions
by diverting attention to incest where procreation is impossible or
prevented. Such dismissals ignore the fact that these procreation problems
are symptoms of, and clues to, the foundational problem with these unions;
namely, their noncomplementary character.
There is a
difference between an infertile union of a man and a woman, where the
“equipment,” so to speak, doesn’t work, on the one hand, and an infertile
union between two members of the same sex, where the equipment doesn’t
even exist, on the other. One might refer to the latter as “structural
infertility” and view it is one surface-sign of, or clue to, the deeper
incongruity of homoerotic relationships. The same applies to higher
incidences in birth defects for incestuous bonds. Such birth defects are
neither inherent to such unions nor unique to them. It is a matter of
degree. But a difference in degree only does not mean that the entire
procreation argument has to be thrown out. The higher structural
propensity of birth defects among incestuous couples can be rightly viewed
as a sign of a deeper, structural incompatibility in such a sexual
pairing.
V. Other Illogical
Arguments Put Forward by Johnson
Problems with the logic of Johnson’s argumentation abound in his book, as
we have seen. Here are a few more.
1. An
illogical attack on “prohibitionists.” According to Johnson,
“prohibitionists” have twisted themselves into an illogical position:
Remarkably, prohibitionist arguments contradict themselves by alternating
between a rhetoric of disgust and a rhetoric of trivialization. On the one
hand, prohibitionists treat gay life as abhorrent…. This is quite
interesting. If gay sex is so disgusting, then the question arises, why
are prohibitionists constantly drawing so much attention to it? On the
other hand, there is also a rhetoric of trivialization. According to the
natural-law argument, because same-gender sexuality is nonprocreative, it
is therefore trivial and meaningless. Again, one has to wonder: if gay sex
is so trivial and meaningless, why is so much energy being expended to
denounce it? (52)
The answer to the
“on the one hand” portion is easy. Johnson asks: If people opposed to
homosexual practice so abhorrent, why are they “constantly drawing so much
attention to it?” The answer is that some like Johnson are constantly
pushing for church and society to embrace abhorrent acts and, in the
process, attack those who oppose homosexual practice as adopting a
position akin to racism and sexism. If homosexualists stop pushing their
agenda, as they have been vigorously doing for 35 years, then those who
support a two-sexes prerequisite will revert back to the relative
inattention to the issue that existed before the homosexualist push.
Try applying
Johnson’s argument to an act that presumably we can all agree is abhorrent
such as pedophilia. By Johnson’s logic, if groups like NAMBLA (North
American Man-Boy Love Association) were ever to gain significant influence
in church and society, it would be contradictory for those who viewed
pedophilia as abhorrent to oppose pedosexual advocacy vigorously.
Obviously that would be ridiculous. The more abhorrent the sexual act, the
more vigorously such acts should be opposed when influential
movements attempt to foist incentives for such behavior on church and
society.
The answer to the
“on the other hand” portion is equally easy. I don’t know any reputable
figure who, in opposing homosexual practice, regards homosexual
intercourse as the moral equivalent of nonprocreative heterosexual acts,
as if the only thing wrong with homosexual practice was its
nonprocreative quality. The position is akin to arguing that incest
becomes trivial once precautions are taken against abnormal births. The
intrinsic inability of a homosexual relationship to bring about
procreation is qualitatively different from an “equipment failure.” The
former gives us clues into the deeper incongruity of type of sexual bonds,
much as does the problem of a higher risk of birth defects when close
blood relations procreate.
Moreover, if one
looks at Johnson’s “on the one hand … on the other hand” argument, one can
see the contradictory premises clearly. On the one hand, according to
Johnson one shouldn’t expend energy in denouncing an act if it is
abhorrent and being pushed on society. One might then presume that one
could spend energy denouncing an act that is not abhorrent. Not so, says
Johnson. One also shouldn’t spend energy denouncing an act that is
trivial. When, pray tell, should one spend energy denouncing an act?
Apparently only when one agrees with Johnson’s denunciation of a
complementarity viewpoint. Then one can write a book about it and make the
rejection of homosexual practice abhorrent.
2. An
illogical attempt at rebutting a nature argument.
According to Johnson, focusing on body parts leads to a
contradictory embrace of rape and incest:
[A natural-law argument that focuses] on body parts for the sake of body
parts implies that every heterosexual union of those parts is uniquely
able to symbolize God’s grace in a way that same-gender unions are [sic]
not. We need only think of the examples of heterosexual rape and incest to
see that this is a false argument. (51)
Would that Johnson
might respond to an earlier rebuttal that I made to this argument when the
press first reported it.
First, who is
focusing only on body parts? I have stated over and over again that
the obvious complementarity of male and female genitals is part of, and
emblematic of, the fact that maleness and femaleness, more broadly
conceived, represent the two halves of the sexual spectrum. In addition,
the focus on a holistic male-female complementarity is not “for the sake
of body parts,” as Johnson erroneously characterizes it, but for the sake
of the Creator who designed us in our embodied existences for certain
kinds of sexual activity and not others.
Second, Johnson’s
counterexamples of heterosexual rape and incest would obviously work only
if the nature argument made sexual complementarity the sole
prerequisite for acceptable sexual behavior. But that is not the
nature argument; it is rather a false caricature of the nature argument.
The nature argument, which Scripture supports, is that a two-sexes
prerequisite is a necessary, but not a sufficient,
formal or structural criterion for valid sexual bonds. It would be absurd
to presume, as Johnson apparently does, that one prerequisite forbids all
others.
This leads to my
third point: Johnson’s counterexample of incest actually establishes the
very nature argument that he seeks to reject therewith. For, if we apply
Johnson’s argument against an anti-homosex view to an anti-incest view, we
come out with untenable results:
A focus on blood unrelatedness for
the sake of blood unrelatedness implies that every non-incestuous union
is uniquely able to symbolize God’s grace in a way that incestuous
unions do not. We need only think of the examples of nonincestuous rape,
polyamory, and pedophilia to see that this is a false argument.
Again, no one is arguing,
or implying, that a certain degree of blood unrelatedness is the only
formal or structural criterion for valid sexual relationships.
Furthermore, the motive for prohibiting all incest, even in adult loving
relationships, is analogous to the motive for prohibiting all homoerotic
activity: sex with persons who are too much alike on a structural level
where a minimum of embodied otherness is required.
In a footnote
Johnson adds: “People who use this argument about the inherent excellence
of heterosexual union counter that rape is wrong because of an absence
of ‘intent’ and ‘commitment’; but if this is so, then the presence
of such ‘intent’ and ‘commitment’ on the part of exclusively committed
same-gender persons ought to qualify them for similar moral praise” (265
n. 22). Again, Johnson makes an elementary mistake in logic. A necessary
prerequisite in one area (here “intent” and “commitment”) does not make
that prerequisite sufficient, ruling out prerequisites in other areas
(here a male-female requirement). If it were otherwise, then the presence
of intent and commitment of the part of exclusively committed adult
siblings, or adult and parent, or three or more persons, or an adult and
child “ought,” in Johnson’s own words, “to qualify them for similar moral
praise.”
3. An
illogical analogy to responses to violence, warfare, and torture.
Johnson finds it amazing when society
whips itself into a frenzy over the prospect of gay marriage but greets
the overwhelming evidence of torture by its own country’s military leaders
with a casual shrug of the shoulders? Or how do we explain the fact that,
when it comes to same-gender sexuality, some religious-minded people are
quick to interpret biblical prohibitions strictly and literally, yet when
the subject is violence or warfare, they find flexibility and numerous
alternative interpretations to the Sermon on the Mount’s admonition to
“turn the other cheek”? (7)
He adds: “Why are certain
people in American churches more upset about gays than they are about
unjust war or torture?” (16).
As a theologian
Johnson ought to know that Scripture contains various views about the
state’s use of force and engagement in warfare but, contrary to what
Johnson argues, a clear univocal view on a two-sexes prerequisite for
sexual relations. It is not likely that Jesus intended his “turn the other
cheek” principle to govern the administration of justice by the state.
Certainly Paul didn’t understand it in the way that Johnson is using it
(Romans 12-13). By Johnson’s reasoning John the Baptist should not have
made such an issue over Herod Antipas’s participation in adult consensual
incest (for which protest John got beheaded). Jesus should not have been
so willing to recommend payment of taxes to the emperor and to make so
sharp a divide between what is Caesar’s and what is God’s, given the
oppression of Roman rule, while making an issue of a remaining loophole in
Scripture’s sexual ethics, divorce and remarriage (Mark 10; Matt 5).
Ironically, Johnson uses a ridiculous argument from silence to infer that
Jesus may have approved of some alleged sexual activity between the
centurion and his “boy” slave (141-42), but draws no conclusions about
Jesus’ unreserved support for the military.
There is also a
difference between reacting to isolated instances of moderate abuse of
prisoners in connection with obtaining information that could save the
lives of thousands from future terrorist attacks (supported even by
Democrat and former president Bill Clinton), on the one hand, and reacting
to a full-court press by people such as Johnson in foisting ecclesiastical
and civil mandates for accepting immoral sexual practice that will change
societal standards for the foreseeable future, on the other hand.
Hopefully Johnson will react vigorously to any future attempts to provide
civil incentives and marital recognition for adult incestuous bonds and
polysexual bonds, even though Johnson’s current support for homosexual
unions undermines the very principles upon which a rejection of incest and
polyamory are based.
4. Bad
revisionist history. According to Johnson,
“Our two thousand years of Christian history have been more mixed than
monolithic” (14). He cites isolated examples of “committed, spiritual
friendships” in the late Renaissance and beyond that allegedly challenge
“the claim that Western civilization in general and Western Christendom in
particular have been uniformly negative in their treatment of same-gender
love” (16).
He suggests, absurdly, that prior to the eighteenth century there were
“merely symbolic condemnations” of homoeroticism (16).
Of course, almost
every form of immorality has at one time or another and in one locale or
another been tacitly accommodated in Western society (even incest).
However, that is an entirely different matter from any widespread public
acceptance or official endorsement. Since overtly homoerotic bonds were
not publicly validated in Western Christian civilization before relatively
recent history, Johnson can substantiate his revisionist view of history
only by deliberately blurring the distinction between erotic and
non-erotic same-sex interrelationships. This makes about as much sense as
blurring erotic and non-erotic multiple-partner bonds, bonds between close
blood relations, and bonds between adults and pre-adolescents. The
presence or absence of an erotic component in all such relationships makes
all the difference in assessing the morality of the relationships. Yet
Johnson instead would have us not be “fixated on genital sex” (p. 15).
5. Some
confusion about choice. At one point Johnson
argues: “One does not simply choose one’s sexual orientation—that much is
clear. Instead, it is something one experiences as a ‘given’” (19).
Similarly: “By definition a sexual orientation is a given and thus
something beyond one’s own choosing” (47). These statements are too
black-and-white. They completely eliminate any human development from
life’s experiences and choices. They also partly contradict admissions
that Johnson makes elsewhere. “Whatever may be its cause, we know that
most people do not experience their sexual orientation as a choice”
(28; my emphasis). This statement at least carries an implicit admission
that some may experience their sexual orientation as a choice (p.
28; my emphasis). Better still is the following statement:
Biological factors may play some role in the formation of sexual
orientation…. In no way do we have evidence that such factors play the
only role…. [T]here are also developmental and psychological processes
in early childhood, as well as culturally bound determinants throughout
life, that contribute to the way each individual experiences sexual
orientation. (27)
Of course, generally
people don’t wake one morning and say, “I think I’ll be a homosexual.” Yet
that is different from arguing that homosexual development is always and
only something “given.” Edward Stein, a homosexualist scholar, challenges
deterministic models of homosexual development and posits instead a
nondeterministic model that incorporates a significant role for
choice—often blind, incremental, and indirect but choice nonetheless.
Like various forms of sexual impulses, the degree to which a homosexual
“orientation” becomes fixed in an individual’s brain and the intensity
with which it is experienced, at least in part and for some, can be
affected by choices regarding fantasy life, responses to social and
environmental factors in childhood and adolescence, the degree to which
one acts on impulses, and the degree of self-motivation for change.
Finally, irrespective of the impact that incremental choices have any
given individual’s homosexual development, people are always responsible
for what they do with what they feel.
Conclusion
When it comes to
treating issues of science, nature, history, and logic Johnson gives
readers ample reason to withhold approval of his arguments. One sees the
same inadequate research, misrepresentation of data, and logical missteps
that characterize Johnson’s treatment of Scripture.
To go to “A Book Not to Be
Embraced: A Critical Review Essay on Stacy Johnson’s A Time to Embrace”
[Part 1: the Scottish Journal of Theology article], click:
pdf:
http://robgagnon.net/articles/homosexStacyJohnsonSJT2.pdf
html:
http://robgagnon.net/Critical%20Review%20of%20Stacy%20Johnson's%20Time%20to%20Embrace.htm
To go to “More Reasons Why Stacy
Johnson’s A Time to Embrace Should Not Be Embraced: Part II: Sodom,
Leviticus, and More on Jesus and Paul,” click:
pdf:
http://robgagnon.net/articles/homosexStacyJohnsonMoreReasonsCritique.pdf
html:
http://robgagnon.net/homosexStacyJohnsonMoreReasonsCritique.htm
Endnotes
See
the studies cited in “Why the Disagreement over the Biblical Witness
on Homosexual Practice? A Response to Myers and Scanzoni, What God
Has Joined Together?’ Reformed Review 59 (2005): 30-33
(online:
http://www.westernsem.edu/files/westernsem/gagnon_autm05_0.pdf);
The Bible and Homosexual Practice, 403-30. Even Myers and
Scanzoni, for example, admit that “women’s sexual orientation also
tends to be less strongly felt and potentially more fluid and
changeable than men’s” (David G. Myers and Letha Dawson Scanzoni,
What God Has Joined Together? A Christian Case for Gay Marriage [HarperSanFrancisco,
2005], 67). The Columbia and Yale authors of one twin study using an
enormous and nationally representative sample of adolescents (30,000)
concluded that “less gendered socialization in early childhood and
preadolescence shapes subsequent same-sex romantic preferences” (Peter
S. Bearman and Hannah Brückner, “Opposite-Sex Twins and Adolescent
Same-Sex Attraction,” American Journal of Sociology 107.5
[2002]: 1179-1205). Another social factor for some homosexual
development, though by no means all, is childhood sexual abuse.
According to William H. James, “There
is an abundance of data suggesting that male homosexuals and
paedophiles report having experienced more sexual abuse (however
defined) in childhood (CSA) than do heterosexual controls…. There are
grounds for supposing that some of the reports are veridical [causally
related], and there is support from a longitudinal study reporting a
small but significant increase in paedophilia in adulthood following
CSA. To summarize: most boys who experience CSA do not later develop
into homosexuals or paedophiles. However, the available evidence
suggests that a few do so as a result of the abuse” (“Two
Hypotheses on the Causes of Male Homosexuality and Paedophilia,”
Journal of Biosocial Sciences 36
[2004]: 371-374; the quotation is from the abstract).