"God and Sex" or "Pants on Fire"?
Nicholas Kristof of the New York
Times on the Bible and Homosexuality
By ROBERT A. J. GAGNON, Ph.D.
Oct. 28, 2004
For
a version with sidebar comments (in pdf) go
here.
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Nicholas Kristof, a columnist for the New York Times, has
produced an ill-informed op-ed piece on the Bible and homosexuality:
"God and Sex" (New York Times, Oct. 23, 2004). Kristof states:
"Over the last couple of months, I've been researching the question of how
the Bible regards homosexuality." All three of the scholars cited in his
editorial are homosexual persons with an obvious ax to grind, and two of
these are not even biblical scholars. Clearly, Kristof needs to
branch out in his research efforts more than he has. In an editorial
loaded with sarcasm for "traditional" views, Kristof ironically offers up
multiply flawed readings. The irony is heightened when one notes the title
of his very next op-ed piece, "Pants on Fire?" (Oct. 27, 2004). The byline
is: "Reality to George W. Bush is not about facts, but about higher
meta-truths." Substitute the name "Nicholas D. Kristof" and apply it to
his assessment of the Bible and homosexuality.
The overall purpose of Kristof's
editorial is political: to persuade "conservatives," or "liberals" who
should be convincing conservatives, that there is little credible basis
for opposing "gay marriage" within the Bible itself. He hopes that by
doing so he can weaken efforts to pass amendments blocking "gay marriage"
in various states. Kristof gives the impression that he personally cares
little about what Scripture says about homosexuality, apart from this
utilitarian political purpose. The end result is a rather cynical and even
sophomoric effort on Kristof's part that, to the discerning reader, only
strengthens the case for opposing "gay marriage." (For my own treatment of
the "gay marriage" issue, see my short presentation in the September 2004
issue of
Presbyterians Today, the fuller version of which appears on my
website at
www.robgagnon.net.)
The "God Made Homosexuals" Argument
Kristof begins by asking rhetorically:
"So when God made homosexuals who fall deeply, achingly in love with each
other, did he goof?" The question is not thought through.
First, no scientific study has even come
close to verifying that homosexuality is a condition determined directly
and irrevocably at birth. For example, several of the least sample-biased
identical twin studies indicate that seven-to-nine times out of ten, when
one member of a identical twin pair self-identifies as non-heterosexual,
the co-twin self-identifies as heterosexual—even though identical twins
are genetic matches and share the same intrauterine hormonal environment.
Kristof cannot even establish a model of congenital determinism for
homosexuality, let alone one that correlates such determinism with a "God
made homosexuals" claim.
Second, Kristof takes no moral or
religious account of the difference between impulse-oriented traits and
immutable, benign, non-behavioral traits like race or ethnicity.
Impulse-oriented traits are not absolutely immutable, since the intensity
of impulses can be elevated or lowered during the course of life,
sometimes radically so. Moreover, impulse-oriented traits are generally
directed toward specific behaviors and are often not inherently benign.
For Kristof's argument to work, he has to make the elementary mistake of
assuming that all such traits are "made by God" and that to think
otherwise is to assert that God "goofed." Yet polysexuality
(dissatisfaction with monogamy), pedosexuality (attraction to children),
and alcoholism are every bit as biologically based as homosexuality, to
say nothing of "normal" impulses for self-centeredness, narcissism,
arrogance, envy, and greed. Does Kristof want to pose for these his two
alternatives: either "God made people that way" and so wants them to
satisfy such desires or "God goofed"?
Third, Kristof's opening line falls flat
from a Christian theological standpoint. The apostle Paul characterized
sin in his letter to the Romans (chs. 5-8) as an innate impulse running
through the members of the human body, passed on by an ancestor, and never
entirely within human control. Appealing to the congenital character of an
impulse does not necessarily absolve it from being sinful. Jesus likewise
talked about an array of impulses emanating "from within, out of the heart
of human beings," that defiles humans, including actively entertained
impulses for sexual behaviors that God categorically forbids in Scripture
(Mark 7:20-23). Kristof's biology-equals-morality rationale has one
wondering whether Kristof has ever heard of the well-attested saying of
Jesus that one cannot be his follower unless one "takes up one's cross,"
"denies oneself," and "loses one's life" (Mark 8:34-37). Or has he ever
come across any of the numerous texts in Paul's writings that refer to
"dying to self," no longer living "in conformity to the flesh," the "new
creation," and "living for God"?
The "Sodom Is Not About Sodomy" Argument
Kristof fares little better when he
begins discussing biblical texts on homosexual practice. In a
condescending manner, he prefaces his remarks by comparing religious
scruples regarding homosexuality to brainless statements like "If English
was good enough for Jesus Christ, it's good enough for us," or to a
disavowal of evolution. As it is, Kristof's own analysis shows that he too
is a fundamentalist of sorts in his religious thinking—a fundamentalist of
the left who allows his own vested ideology to get in the way of a fair
review of what the Judeo-Christian Scriptures have to say about homosexual
practice.
Not surprisingly, Kristof dismisses the
story of Sodom in Genesis 19:4-11, and Ezekiel's interpretation of it, as
"about hospitality, rather than homosexuality." Kristof snidely comments
that "the most obvious lesson from Sodom is that when you're attacked by
an angry mob, the holy thing to do is to offer up your virgin daughters."
Actually, the surrounding narrative implicitly criticizes Lot for offering
up his daughters rather than trusting in God's provision. This is
indicated by the successful action of the angels in blinding the mob and
by the subsequent payback of incest committed by Lot's daughters against
their father.
Citing Mark Jordan's The Invention of
Sodomy in Christian Theology, Kristof states as fact that "it was only
in the 11th century that theologians began to condemn
homosexuality as sodomy." The true facts are that, long before the 11th
century, a number of early Jewish and Christian writers picked up on the
male-male sexual activity of the Sodomites as inherently degrading. In
the1st century (A.D.) alone, one
can cite among others: Philo, Josephus, and, some critics to the contrary,
Jude 7 and 2 Peter 2:6-10 (on the last two texts go
here, pp. 10-13, or
here, section V.). Ezekiel, back in the 6th century
B.C., knew the Holiness Code
(Leviticus 17-24), or a precursor document, and interpreted the Sodom
story in part through the lens of the absolute Levitical prohibitions
against male-male intercourse (18:22; 20:13). When Ezekiel 16:49-50
describes the sin of Sodom as "not aiding the poor and needy" and
"committing an abomination," it refers to two different offenses, as the
list of vices in Ezekiel 18:12 makes clear when it distinguishes these two
phrases.
The Deuteronomistic History (Joshua
through 2 Kings), another work of the 6th century
B.C., contains a parallel story to
the story of Sodom; namely, the Levite at Gibeah (Judges 19:22-25). There
can be little doubt that the male-male dimension of the threatened sexual
activity factored prominently in the Deuteronomistic Historian’s
indictment of the residents of Gibeah, given his apparent revulsion
elsewhere in the History for the consensual homoerotic associations
of the qedeshim (literally, “consecrated ones”), cult figures who
sometimes served as the passive receptive partners in male-male
intercourse.
The narrator of the Sodom story in
Genesis 19, the "Yahwist" (J), also tells the similar story of Ham's
rape of his father Noah in Genesis 9:20-27 ("seeing the nakedness of" is a
Hebrew metaphor for having sexual intercourse). Few would argue that such
a story indicts only coercive forms of incest with one's father.
Like Leviticus 18, the narrative blames the subjugation of the Canaanites
on a "kitchen sink" of sexual sins, including incest and male-male
intercourse, acts that are morally wrong whether they are done to a
consenting or coerced partner.
Kristof himself acknowledges that
Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13 oppose, at least, male anal sex, even on the
part of consenting partners. Why, then, would he think that the narrator
of Genesis 19 might have approved of a consensual act of male-male
intercourse? Indeed, every narrative, law, proverb, exhortation, metaphor,
and piece of poetry in the Hebrew Bible having anything to do with sexual
relations presupposes a male-female prerequisite.
Finally, to assume that the narrator of
Genesis 19 would have been favorably disposed to an act of consensual
male-male intercourse is absurd in view of ancient Near Eastern texts that
held in low repute men who willingly consented to be penetrated by
other men.
It is obvious from these concentric
circles of historical and literary context that the Sodom story contains
an indictment of male-male intercourse per se, though one would never know
it from Kristof's editorial.
The "Irrelevance of Levitical Prohibitions" Argument
To Kristof's credit, he acknowledges the
obvious: The prohibitions of male-male intercourse in Leviticus 18:22 and
20:13 are just that. But Kristof fudges a bit by suggesting, with some
scholars, that the prohibition may be limited to "male anal sex." To
insinuate, however, that these prohibitions do not imply any opposition to
non-insertive homoerotic behavior makes about as much sense as arguing
that the prohibitions of incest, adultery, and bestiality have no
implications for erotic behaviors short of penetration. Following Kristof's logic, erotic kissing and fondling of one's mother would have
been acceptable in ancient Israel so long as no penetration occurred. The
prime overarching concern of the sex laws in Leviticus 18 and 20 is not
status differentiation, much less misogyny, but rather issues of
structural congruity and incongruity. A male is not another male's sexual
counterpart; a woman is.
Kristof notes that the prohibition of
homosexual practice "never made the Top 10 lists of commandments." Neither
did the commands not to have sex with one's mother or with animals. That
doesn't mean that such commands were less significant than the command
against adultery. It means that the Decalogue dealt with typical offenses
and a number of the commands were suggestive of others. The commandments
to honor one's father and mother (5), not to commit adultery (7), and not
to covet a neighbor's wife (10) all suggest a male-female prerequisite to
sexual unions. It should also be noted that Leviticus 20:10-16 groups the
prohibition of male-male intercourse with other first-tier sexual
offenses, including adultery, incest with one's stepmother or
daughter-in-law (and, by implication, one's mother and daughter), and
bestiality. Thankfully, when Paul dealt with a case of adult, consensual
incest in 1 Corinthians 5, he didn't draw Kristof's conclusion that incest
"never made the Top 10 lists of commandments." Simply put, while the
Decalogue contains important commands, it is not a "Top Ten list."
Kristof adds, again sarcastically, "a
plain reading of the Book of Leviticus is that male anal sex is every bit
as bad as other practices that the text condemns, like wearing a
polyester-and-cotton shirt (Leviticus 19:19)." To compare the significance
of the prohibition of male-male intercourse to the prohibition against
wearing a garment made of two different materials is highly tendentious
and shows an extraordinary lack of hermeneutical (i.e., interpretive)
sensitivity to the witness of Scripture. The penalty for wearing a garment
made of two different fabrics was probably just the destruction of the
fabric (compare Deuteronomy 22:9-11). Moreover, the prohibition of cloth
mixtures was not absolute. Mixtures of linen and wool were enjoined for
some Tabernacle cloths, parts of the priestly wardrobe, and the tassel of
the laity. The reason for the prohibitions appears to be that mixtures
symbolized penetration into the divine realm (so Jacob Milgrom). This does
not mean, however, that all mixing has a sacral quality, for not even
priests are permitted to engage in bestiality; nor that all mixing is
forbidden, for heterosexual intercourse requires a greater degree
of mixing than homosexual intercourse. The prohibition of cloth
mixtures in Leviticus 19:19 and some other prohibitions in the chapter
(notably the laws in 19:27-28), are not taken up in the New Testament.
Their temporal limitations are self-evident, possessing as they do a
largely symbolic character. Incest, adultery, same-sex intercourse, and
bestiality perhaps have a negative symbolic value. Yet their wrongness is
hardly exhausted by viewing them as symbols.
Kristof's Failure to Distinguish the Best Analogies
This brings us to the question: Why
didn't Kristof choose the prohibition of incest as a far closer analogy to
the prohibition of male-male intercourse than an alleged analogy to cloth
mixtures? There is much to commend an analogy between incest prohibitions
and the prohibitions of male-male intercourse.
-
Both sets of prohibitions involve acts of sexual
intercourse that are strongly, pervasively, and absolutely proscribed in
the canon of Scripture (this is certainly true of man-mother incest).
Indeed, both are mentioned in the sex laws in Leviticus 18 and, in ch.
20, among first-tier sexual offenses.
-
Both acts, incest and male-male intercourse, are
regarded as wrong because they involve sex with another who is too much
of a structural same—incest on the familial level of blood relatedness
(no sex with "the flesh of one's own flesh" according to Leviticus
18:6), homosexual practice on the level of sex or gender. (Note that the
cloth-prohibition involves a prohibition against mixing different
things, not things that are too much alike.)
-
Both acts can be conducted in the context of consensual,
committed, monogamous, adult relationships.
-
Both acts suffer from a disproportionately high rate of
negative side-effects: incest from procreative abnormalities and
intergenerational sex; male-male intercourse from higher rates of
sexually transmitted disease, mental health issues, multiple sex
partners, short-term relationships, man-boy love, problematic sexual
practices (like penile-anal or oral-anal intercourse), and gender
identity disorders. At the same time, neither incest nor male-male
intercourse (nor any other form of consensual sexual practice, including
polyamorous behavior) produces scientifically measurable harm to all
participants in all circumstances.
Whatever defects there may be in the analogy to incest, there are
certainly far fewer drawbacks than an analogy to fabric blends. We don't
expect an analogue to match in all respects the thing to which it is being
compared, for then it would cease being an analogue and would become
instead the thing itself. But we do differentiate near and remote
analogues on the basis of the quality and number of the points of contact.
So the
question remains: Why didn't Kristof write, "a plain reading of the Book
of Leviticus is that male anal sex is every bit as bad as other practices
that the text condemns, like having sex with one's mother (Leviticus
18:7)," instead of ". . . like wearing a polyester-and-cotton shirt
(Leviticus 19:19)"? Kristof chose a remote analogy when a close one was
available to him. Why did he do this? Obviously he was blinded by his own
ideological aims.
Kristof's carelessness also comes across
in his blog "KristofResponds" at
http://www.nytimes.com/kristofresponds. In several follow-ups to his
editorial he cites various Old Testament laws that we no longer follow,
mustering all the theological sophistication of a laundry list. In
Kristof's "spray method" it matters not to him whether the example at hand
was:
-
Carried over from the Old Testament to the New or
omitted from the New (the latter either because the proscription,
prescription, or practice was treated as a specifically Jewish matter or
because it was viewed as an instance of Mosaic permissiveness to
"hardness of heart," chiefly male);
-
Categorized by Scripture as a marginal concern or as a
major offense;
-
Pervasively maintained in each of the Testaments, at
least implicitly, or probably held only by a single author or two;
-
Similar to the prohibition of homosexual practice in
only one or two superficial areas or in many areas of deep structure.
Kristof appears to be more concerned
with dispensing with the biblical witness against homosexual practice, by
any means necessary, than in carefully listening to the texts in question
and sensitively appropriating them for a contemporary context.
The "David and Jonathan Did It" Argument
Kristof assures his readers
that "the Bible is big enough to encompass gay relationships. . . . For
example, 1 Samuel can be read as describing gay affairs between David and
Jonathan." I do not know of any reputable biblical scholar, even on the
pro-homosex side, who contends that David and Jonathan had "gay affairs."
Such a contention shows no sensitivity to ancient Near Eastern conventions
of male-male, non-erotic sociability, the typical use of love language in
covenant-treaties, and the political apology for David's rise to power.
I have nine pages in The Bible and Homosexual Practice on why a
homoerotic reading misconstrues the Succession Narrative in 1 Samuel (pp.
146-54). How about reading it, Mr. Kristof?
The "Jesus Said Nothing
About It" Argument
Kristof tells us that while
"Jesus never said a word about gays," he did warn against amassing
wealth (Kristof misinterprets Jesus as contending that all persons should
sell all their property). Jesus also never said a word about man-mother
incest but few would contend that Jesus' "silence" on such a matter
indicated his lack of concern. (Indeed, in 1 Corinthians 5 Paul could
recommend action against incest "in the name of the Lord Jesus," despite
the absence of a specific saying of Jesus on the subject.) It would have
been absurd for Jesus to go around first-century Palestine telling fellow
Jews to stop having sex with members of the same sex. Quite simply, no one
was doing it, at least not publicly. As regards sexual matters, Jesus
focused on areas of dispute and did not belabor biblical core values in
sexual ethics that (1) he agreed with and (2) no one in early Judaism
publicly disagreed with or violated in practice.
We do know that Jesus in Mark
10 appealed to Genesis 1:27 ("God made them male and female") and Genesis
2:24 ("For this reason a man shall . . . become joined to his woman and
the two shall become one flesh") as texts normative and prescriptive for
defining appropriate sexual behavior. Simply because he focused on
marriage's indissolubility and its monogamous character does not mean that
he disregarded the obvious other-sex prerequisite given in the phrases
"male and female," "a man . . . becoming joined to a woman." To the
contrary: Jesus' fixation on the number "two" in a sexual relationship was
itself predicated on the existence of two sexes ("male and female he made
them"), whose union creates a necessary and sufficient sexual whole that
needs no third partner. The story of the creation of woman in Genesis
2:18-24 provides a beautiful illustration of the fact that man and woman
are each other's sexual counterparts, two halves of a single sexual whole.
The Hebrew word often translated "rib" is better understood as "side," in
accordance with its 40 other occurrences in the Hebrew Bible and some
subsequent ancient interpretation of Genesis 2. A same-sex partner does
not, and cannot, reunite the two sexual halves into an integrated whole.
Kristof charges "conservative
Christians" with inconsistency because they don't rush to get themselves
castrated in alleged accordance with Jesus' praise for those who make
themselves eunuchs (Matthew 19:10-12). But here Kristof shows himself to
be a literalist of the text—when it serves his purposes to be so, even if
the text points in a different direction. Clearly Jesus was making an
analogy or comparison, not establishing an identity, between literal
eunuchs and people "who made themselves eunuchs" by taking on voluntary
celibacy "for the sake of the kingdom of heaven." Moreover, Jesus did not
prescribe such celibacy for all persons but "only those to whom it is
given"—recognizing, of course, that structural prerequisites remain for
valid sexual unions.
Kristof even goes so far as to
claim that Jesus' healing of the centurion's "boy" or "slave" in Matthew
8:5-13 and Luke 7:1-10 may indicate Jesus' approval of homosexual
behavior. He alleges that the centurion and the slave may have been lovers
and notes that Jesus said not a condemnatory word about the relationship.
The argument is ridiculous. If the centurion and his slave were engaged in
a homosexual relationship, then it was likely to have been of a
particularly coercive and exploitative sort. Using Kristof's logic, we
would have to suppose, then, that Jesus was in favor of coercing slaves to
have sex with their masters and to feminize their appearance (up to and
possibly including castration), inasmuch as Jesus did not speak explicitly
against it. Luke speaks of Jewish elders in Capernaum (Galilee)
interceding on the centurion's behalf. Should we suppose that these elders
too were okay with homosexual unions of this or any type, when all the
evidence from Jewish texts of the Second Temple period and beyond
indicates unequivocal and absolute opposition to all homosexual practice?
Certainly neither Matthew nor Luke read the story to support homosexual
unions. Luke portrays the centurion as a "God-fearer" ("he loves our
nation and he himself built the synagogue for us"), which makes it highly
unlikely that the centurion engaged in homosexual activity. Abstinence
from homosexual activity and other illicit sexual unions was a minimal
expectation of the "Noahide laws" for Gentiles developing in early
Judaism. Certainly, too, not all masters were having sex with their male
slaves so Jesus could hardly have assumed homoerotic activity on the part
of the centurion. I have argued in my own work on this story that the
earliest recoverable version, lying behind the Matthew-Luke agreements (Q)
and the variant version in John 4:46-54, involves an official at
Capernaum, in the employ of Herod Antipas, whose "boy," i.e. "son," was on
the verge of death (only Luke reads "slave"). Certainly the official was
not having sex with his son!
Kristof never bothers to
consider an array of evidence that points to Jesus' acceptance of his
Bible's strong opposition to homosexual practice, including Jesus' appeal
to the normative status of Genesis 1:27 and 2:24, mentioned above.
·
We know that
Jesus at a couple of points (adultery of the heart, divorce) actually
intensified the demand on sexual ethics, even as he reached out
aggressively to those most violating that demand and at greatest risk of
not entering the kingdom of God. Jesus was a much less vigorous critic of
the law of Moses than Paul and we know what Paul's view on same-sex
intercourse was. Jesus believed that what one did sexually could get one
thrown into hell; that one should "cut off" an eye or hand (again, Mr.
Kristof, a metaphor!) if it threatens one's downfall because it is better
to go into heaven maimed than to go into hell full-bodied (Matthew
5:29-30).
·
We have no record
of anyone in the Judaism of Jesus' day expressing anything less than
strong opposition to any and all homosexual practice. If Jesus had wanted
his disciples to have a different view, he would have had to tell them so.
As it was, the earliest church was united in its opposition to homosexual
practice. For example, the "Apostolic Decree" in Acts 15 welcomes Gentiles
while prohibiting the "sexual immorality" (porneia) that typifies
Gentile life—a text with clear links to the sex laws in Leviticus 18.
·
Jesus could speak
of "sexual immoralities" which everywhere in early Judaism included a
prohibition of homosexual practice (again, see the so-called "Noahide
laws" binding on Gentiles).
·
Jesus obviously
accepted the commandment against adultery in the Decalogue, which in
context presupposed a man-woman marriage and was treated by many Jews of
the period as an overarching rubric for the major sex laws against incest,
same-sex intercourse, and bestiality.
·
Jesus
acknowledged Sodom’s role in Scripture as the prime example of abuse of
visitors (Matthew 10:14-15; Luke 10:10-12), which in the context of other
early Jewish texts indicated a special revulsion for the attempt at
treating males sexually as females.
The notion that Jesus was
neutral toward homosexual unions, much less favorably disposed, is
historically preposterous. Mr. Kristof should know better.
The "Paul Is All Alone
and Untrustworthy" Argument
Kristof admits that "the
religious right" is correct in seeing Paul as opposed to "male
homosexuality" (Romans 1:24-27; 1 Corinthians 6:9; 1 Timothy 1:10; pace
Mr. Kristof, it's not only the "religious right" that doesn't want to see
coercive cultural validation of homosexual practice). Yet he claims "the
right has a tougher time explaining why lesbians shouldn't marry because
the Bible has no unequivocal condemnation of lesbian sex." He thinks that
it is possible that Romans 1:26 refers to "sex during menstruation or to
women who are aggressive during sex." This non-homoerotic interpretation
is so improbable that it can be easily discounted. (Kristof acknowledges
that Bernadette Brooten, a lesbian New Testament scholar who has worked
extensively on lesbianism in antiquity, is convinced of a reference to
lesbianism in Romans 1:26.)
The parallel phrasing of Romans
1:26 and 1:27 leaves little doubt that lesbian intercourse was intended in
1:26: “even their females exchanged the natural use [i.e. of
the male] for one contrary to nature, and likewise also the males,
having left the natural use of the female, were inflamed in their
yearning for one another, males with males.” For the “likewise also” of
1:27 to be appropriate, both the thing exchanged and the thing exchanged
for must be comparable—here sex with members of the same sex, not
non-coital sex. Male and female homoeroticism are paired often enough in
ancient sources so that there is nothing surprising about such a
pairing in Rom 1:26-27. In addition, while it was commonplace to refer to
female homoeroticism as “unnatural,” there are no explicit references in
ancient texts to anal or oral heterosexual intercourse as
unnatural.
Finally, in the context of the
Greco-Roman world, it is not possible that Paul could have been strongly
opposed to male homosexual practice while being favorably disposed to
female homoeroticism. For although there was some openness among Greek and
Roman moralists to specific forms of male homoerotic practice, attitudes
toward female homosexual practice were uniformly negative. Paul's
statement that "even their women" engage in such practices underscores the
point. That Paul and other biblical authors were opposed to lesbian
intercourse can be taken as an historical given.
In the end Kristof utterly
rejects Paul as "our lawgiver" because Paul elsewhere instructs women to
be veiled and to keep their hair long (1 Cor 11:2-16). However, as we have
seen, the attempt by Kristof to isolate Paul from a much broader
opposition to homosexual practice across the canonical landscape must be
judged a failure. It is not just a question of ignoring Paul but rather of
ignoring Scripture's united, strong, and unequivocal witness. Furthermore,
the analogy regarding veils is a poor one, just like his analogy between
the Levitical laws concerning male-male intercourse and mixing two kinds
of fabric. Paul does not consider the hairstyles and veiling to be a
do-or-die issue. No warning is given regarding possible exclusion from the
kingdom of God for those who disregard this "custom," unlike the one that
he issues regarding same-sex intercourse (1 Corinthians 6:9-10). His
ultimate concern is that Corinthian women and men not attempt to disregard
all marks of sexual differentiation in attempts to exercise prophetic
gifts. There are overtones of concern here for a slippery slope leading to
homoerotic practices or at least the appearance thereof. Kristof confuses
the cultural accoutrements of Paul's concern for homosexual practice for
the concern itself. Hairstyles and headdresses are poor analogues to a
form of sexual behavior that Scripture pervasively, strongly, absolutely,
and counterculturally rejects. Again, a much closer analogue to Paul's
opposition to homosexual practice is his opposition to incest, even of an
adult, consensual variety (1 Corinthians 5). Conveniently, Kristof again
chooses to ignore the stronger point of comparison.
Kristof's "Solutions" and
the Charge of "Cherry Picking"
Kristof closes by recommending
one of two "solutions" to the allegedly insoluble problem of appropriating
the Bible for a contemporary context. One "solution," he suggests, is to
"emphasize the sentiment in Genesis that 'it is not good for the human to
be alone' [Genesis 2:18], and allow gay lovers to marry." The problem with
this interpretation is that it completely ignores the man-woman structural
prerequisite for sexual relations portrayed in Genesis 2:21-24. The story
requires a sexual complement, not just a nondescript intimate life
partner. A woman supplies what is missing from male sexuality. A man
cannot become "more male" by merging with another male. Genesis 2:21-24
illustrates a conditional opportunity for sexual intimacy, not an
opportunity by right that disregards embodied existence and deep-structure
prerequisites.
The other "solution" proposed
by Kristof, perhaps flippantly, is to "ban marriage altogether" since
"Paul disapproves of marriage except for the sex-obsessed, saying that it
is best 'to remain unmarried as I am.'" Yet, like so many of his other
interpretations of biblical texts, Kristof misunderstands Paul's argument
in 1 Corinthians 7. Yes, Paul commends singleness but not because he is
anti-passion, much less anti-marriage, but rather because of pragmatic
missionary considerations in a time of persecution and great stress. Nor
is it fair to conclude that Paul says everything that he believes about
marriage in 1 Corinthians 7, as if Paul thought that marriage served only
the purpose of a legitimate safety valve for pent-up sexual desires. His
arguments were probably conditioned in part by the Corinthian contention
that they, as "spiritual people," were beyond sexual temptation. In
addition, Kristof's observation presupposes enjoining sexual relations by
unmarried persons whereas this was precisely the circumstance that Paul
was trying to prevent. Of course, unlike Kristof and like Jesus, Paul was
not requiring an end to marriage but only putting forward an alternative
for those who had a gift to abstain from sexual relations. Like Jesus,
too, Paul was not elevating a "right to sex" over structural prerequisites
for sexual unions. Burning sexual desire was not an excuse for
circumventing various prerequisites (for gender, degree of blood
unrelatedness, number of sex partners at one time, age, etc.).
Kristof's ultimate complaint is
that "conservatives" "cherry-pick biblical phrases and ignore the central
message of love." The reality is the obverse of what Kristof argues, at
least so far as Kristof's op-ed piece is concerned. It is Kristof who
approaches the biblical text with the singular aim of bending it to his
own purposes. He often ignores literary and historical context matters
inconvenient to his reading, makes a series of specious exegetical moves,
and develops no coherent or consistent criteria for distinguishing close
analogues from distant analogues. He "cherry-picks" Scripture for texts
that, he hopes, will make any significant appeal to Scripture look absurd
in a vain effort to make opposition to homosexual practice look arbitrary.
To call an appeal to the Bible's witness against homosexual practice
"cherry-picking" is more absurd even than contending that the Bible's
witness against man-mother incest is "cherry-picking." What would
constitute "cherry-picking" is the attempt to show that a two-sex
requirement for sexual unions is a marginal concern of the writers of
Scripture.
As regards Kristof's complaint
that "conservatives" "ignore [the Bible's/Jesus'] central message of
love," it is hard to see how this is so unless one simply equates love
with the desire for sexually intimate relationships. Clearly, such an
absolute equation is misguided. Jesus interpreted Leviticus 19:18, "love
your neighbor as yourself," as broadly as possible so that "neighbor"
meant "anyone with whom you might come into contact, whose help you might
want to solicit in an hour of dire need, including an enemy." Yet Jesus
construed the Genesis creation stories as narrowing the number of
sex-partners lifetime to one. So his command to love embraced everyone
while his sexual ethic narrowed to one other of the other sex. Maintaining
structural prerequisites to sexual intercourse, then, does not violate
Jesus' emphasis on love.
What is unloving is to
celebrate the developmental shortcomings in being erotically attracted to
what already is or has as a sexual being: male for maleness, female for
femaleness. An attempt at completing the sexual self through merger with a
sexual same is a manifestation of sexual narcissism or sexual
self-deception. It is buying into a lie about one's sexual identity. "Gay
marriage" must always be an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms, inasmuch
as marriage presupposes the reunion of the two sexes into an integrated
sexual whole. True love, the kind of love promoted by Jesus, retains and
sometimes even intensifies core values in sexual ethics in Scripture—of
which the two-sex requirement is foundational—while reaching out in love
to those most inclined to violate that standard.
Dr. Robert A. J. Gagnon is
Associate Professor of New Testament at Pittsburgh Theological Seminary.
He is the author of
The Bible and Homosexual Practice: Texts and Hermeneutics (Abingdon,
2001) and the co-author of Homosexuality and the Bible: Two Views
(Fortress, 2003).
© 2004 Robert A. J. Gagnon