No Ordination
Essentials “For All Time and All Persons”? Ten Reasons Why the
Achtemeier Overture Is Extremist and Invalid
Robert A. J.
Gagnon, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of New Testament, Pittsburgh Theological Seminary
gagnon@pts.edu,
www.robgagnon.net
Feb. 24, 2008
For a PDF version with proper
pagination and format click
here
Do you believe that when presbyteries and sessions examine individual
candidates for ordained office they should have a right to declare faith
in Christ and abstinence from adultery nonessential requirements? If you
are among the overwhelming majority of reasonable persons in the church
who think otherwise, you disagree with Mark Achtemeier, a professor of
theology at Dubuque Seminary,
and the majority of voting
members attending the Feb. 16 meeting of the John Knox Presbytery.
For such would be the
theologically insane effect of the
overture that
Achtemeier pushed for
and the John Knox Presbytery passed, if the overture were interpreted
according to its Rationale.
According to Achtemeier et al., there are no identifiable
churchwide essentials for ordained office—at least so long as the
candidate is able “to perform the constitutional functions unique to his
or her office (such as administration of the sacraments).”
The overture rationale states categorically:
For any
governing body to declare a standard ‘essential’ in the abstract,
for all time and persons, is wholly at odds with the historic
practice and theological commitments of the Presbyterian Church.
(point 5)
That means that Achtemeier et al. believe that it is “wholly at odds”
with the PCUSA to declare that faith in Christ as Savior and Lord (or
that one is not saved by personal merit, or that God is ultimately
sovereign, etc.) or refraining from adultery (or sexual promiscuity, or
sex with one’s parents, or bestiality, etc.) is an essential for
officers of the church “for all time and all persons.” Everything
is to be decided “on an individual, case-by-case basis” because, who
knows, the candidate in question may have some other virtues that would
offset any given violation. So zealous are Achtemeier and the
voting majority of the John Knox Presbytery to make it possible to
ordain homosexually active candidates that they are willing to have such
absurdities take place if that is the price that must be paid.
As bad as this development would be—and we will elaborate on it further
at the end of this article—it is only one of at least ten major problems
with the “Achtemeier overture” (as I shall refer to it). The author of
the Rationale of the overture repeatedly shows a penchant to bend the
truth about Scripture, the history of the church, the church’s theology,
and the constitutional documents of the PCUSA in order to reach, by any
means necessary, a predetermined ideological objective.
It’s worth noting that Achtemeier and the majority voters at John Knox
Presbytery are opposing a unanimous decision by the GAPJC, a court that
contains a number of persons (perhaps a majority) who would not mourn
the loss of a male-female prerequisite for a valid sexual bond enshrined
in G-6.0106b. Yet even these members of the court had the constitutional
integrity to recognize that the “fidelity and chastity” provision, like
it or not, has all the earmarks of an essential ordination standard.
Achtemeier et al. now stand to the extreme left of those judges, which
says something about the lack of constitutional integrity and
reasonableness in their own stance.
Some Background Information
The Achtemeier overture is an attempt at overruling, through a General
Assembly “Authoritative Interpretation” of G-6.0108,
the days-old decision in
Bush, et al. vs. the Presbytery of Pittsburgh rendered by the
PCUSA’s high court, the GAPJC.
The latter put an end to permitted departures from the “fidelity and
chastity” provision of G-6.0106b, which confines the sexual relations of
officers of the church to “the covenant of marriage between a man and a
woman” (for analysis see my “GAPJC Scraps Scruples” article
here).
The GAPJC did so in part—but, as we shall see, only in part—by
distinguishing between churchwide “manner of life” or “behavioral”
standards and at least some “beliefs and opinions,” making the former
often more necessary for compliance than the latter.
The Achtemeier overture allegedly would make “the requirements of
G-6.0108 apply equally to all ordination standards,” both belief and
behavior standards. The overture is worded thus:
The
requirements of G-6.0108 apply equally to all ordination standards
of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.). G-6.0108 requires examining
bodies to give prayerful and careful consideration, on an
individual, case-by-case basis, to any departure from an ordination
standard in matters of belief or practice that a candidate may
declare during examination. However, the examining body is not
required to accept a departure from standards, and cannot excuse a
candidate’s inability to perform the constitutional functions unique
to his or her office (such as administration of the sacraments).
Achtemeier et al. think that this will have the desired effect of
allowing examining bodies to ordain homosexually active candidates for
church office. Here are ten reasons why the Achtemeier overture is
extremist and invalid.
-
The overture’s first sentence about
equalizing all standards is contradicted by the overture’s last
sentence and by G-6.0108.
-
Ordaining violators of the “fidelity
and chastity” provision of G-6.0106b would be an act “obstructing the
constitutional governance of the church”(G-6.0108a) and would permit
ordained officers to scruple women’s ordination.
-
The overture has no impact on the
GAPJC’s main distinction between a specific standard singled out from
amongst all other standards and broad, undifferentiated standards.
-
The overture dishonestly ignores the
singling-out effect in G-6.0106b when it treats the sexuality
requirement as merely “one among many standards.”
-
The overture’s Rationale pretends that the GAPJC has
acted in an unconstitutional and anti-Presbyterian manner by making
the “fidelity and chastity” requirement the “single exception” to no
essentials; yet the Presbyterian Church itself through the
Constitution has singled out this and other identifiable essentials.
-
Contrary to what the overture
Rationale claims, neither G-6.0108 nor its 2006 “Authoritative
Interpretation” prohibits a determination of essentials outside the
context of examining an individual candidate; indeed, the reverse is
the case.
-
The wording of the overture, read
carefully, does not appear to accomplish what its Rationale says it
will accomplish.
-
The idea that an examining body has
carte blanche to permit any departure from ordination standards is
supportable neither from Scripture (Paul) nor from Reformed history
(Calvin, the Westminster Standards, the Adopting Act of 1729).
-
The overture Rationale’s appeals to
unity as a basis for eliminating identifiable churchwide essentials
are self-serving, irrelevant to constitutional obligations, and
inaccurate.
-
The claim that there are no
essentials of the Christian faith “for all time and persons” has the
theologically insane effect of giving any examining body the right to
ordain candidates who deny even the most basic Christian beliefs and
engage in the most unethical and immoral behaviors.
The rest of the article consists of commentary on each of these points.
1. The Overture’s First Sentence about Equalizing All Standards Is
Contradicted by the Overture’s Last Sentence and by G-6.0108
The first problem with the overture’s validity is that the overture
contradicts itself on the matter of equalizing all ordination standards,
to say nothing of contradicting G-6.0108 itself. It begins by stating
that G-6.0108 would apply equally to “all” ordination standards but ends
by making a huge exception for behavioral standards that have to do with
the performance of “constitutional functions.” This means that, contrary
to the wording of the overture, G-6.0108 would not be applied
equally to “all” ordination standards. Indeed, G-6.0108 cannot be
applied equally to all ordination standards since G-6.0108 itself
rejects the notion that all ordination standards are equal. It
explicitly prohibits “serious departure” from standards (i.e. departure
from essential standards), departures from standards that involve “the
rights and views of others,” and departures from standards that involve
“the constitutional governance of the church.” The fact that the first
sentence of the overture is contradicted by the last sentence and by
G-6.0108 signals that the overture is convoluted and unconstitutional.
2. Ordaining Violators of the “Fidelity and Chastity” Provision of
G-6.0106b Would Be an Act “Obstructing the Constitutional Governance of
the Church”(G-6.0108a) and Would Permit Ordained Officers to Scruple
Women’s Ordination
A second problem for the overture’s validity is that every standard that
speaks to who can and cannot be ordained arguably involves “the
constitutional governance of the church” (to use the language of
G-6.0108a) and thus a “constitutional function” of ordained officers (to
use the language of the Achtemeier overture), certainly of ordained
officers involved in the process of examining, ordaining, or installing
candidates for church office. This would obviously include the “fidelity
and chastity” provision of G-6.0106b since it clearly specifies whom a
governing body may not ordain. G-6.0106b specifically singles out
candidates for church office who do not abide by “the requirement to
live either in fidelity within the covenant of marriage between a man
and a woman (W-4.9001), or chastity in singleness” as among those who “shall
not be ordained and/or installed as deacons, elders, or ministers of
the Word and Sacrament.” Therefore any participation by an officer of
the church in ordaining homosexually active candidates would be, by
definition, an act “obstructing the constitutional governance of the
church” and thus a violation of G-6.0108a.
This is exactly the conclusion that the GAPJC came to in the Bush
case: “It would be an
obstruction of constitutional governance to permit examining bodies
to ignore or waive a specific standard that has been adopted by the
whole church, such as the ‘fidelity and chastity’ portion of G-6.0106b,
or any other similarly specific provision” (p. 7, emphasis added). There
is nothing in the explicit language of the Achtemeier overture that
suggests any other interpretation—in the Rationale, yes, but in the
overture itself, no. Indeed, and ironically, candidates who declared an
intention not to comply with the “fidelity and chastity” requirement
would necessarily be declaring a desire not to perform their very first
“constitutional function,” namely, to refrain from participating in the
ordination of persons whom the Book of Order expressly forbids
from being ordained—in this case, themselves.
This overture also jeopardizes the essential character of affirming
women’s ordination. The prohibition not to ordain homosexually active
candidates and the enjoining of women’s ordination in the Book of
Order are inextricably connected as regards their effect on
“constitutional governance.” To ordain or install homosexually active
candidates would necessarily entail “obstructing the constitutional
governance of the church,” every bit as much as choosing not to
ordain or install women candidates because they are women. If the
act of refusing to ordain women on the grounds of a
freedom-of-conscience scruple would be an impermissible act “obstructing
the constitutional governance of the church” (in the words of G-6.0108a)
and a failure to perform “the constitutional functions unique to [the
candidate’s] office” (in the words of the Achtemeier overture), then so
too would be the act of ordaining homosexually active candidates in
direct violation of the specific provision in G-6.0106b not to ordain
such candidates.
By the same token, if the Achtemeier overture made it possible to ordain
someone who declares a scruple against the “fidelity and chastity”
portion of G-6.0106b then it would necessarily also make it possible to
ordain someone who declares a scruple against the affirmation of women’s
ordination. The degree to which refusing to participate in the
ordination of a qualified female candidate would be or would not be an
obstruction of constitutional governance is the degree to which
participating in the ordination of an unqualified homosexually active
candidate would be or would not be an obstruction of the same
constitutional governance. Consistency is required here.
3. The Overture Has No Impact
on the GAPJC’s Main Distinction between a Specific Standard Singled Out
from amongst All Other Standards and Broad, Undifferentiated Standards
A third problem for the overture’s
validity is that in attempting to eliminate a distinction between
behavioral standards and belief standards (however inconsistently), the
overture does not do away with the whole of the GAPJC’s argument against
scrupling the sexuality standard in G-6.0106b. An integral part of that
argument is the fact that “the
church has decided to single out this particular manner of life
standard and require churchwide conformity to it for all ordained church
officers” (p. 5, emphasis added). G-6.0106b explicitly singles out this
one requirement for specific mention from “among” all “the
historic confessional standards of the church” and does so for the
obvious purpose of stressing compliance. In effect, the church is
saying: At least this particular ordination requirement must be
maintained without permitted departures.
Moreover, the GAPJC makes a clear
distinction between “the broad reference” in the last sentence of
G-6.0106b to “any self-acknowledged practice which the confessions call
sin,” and “a specific
standard that has been adopted by the whole church, such as the
‘fidelity and chastity’ portion of G-6.0106b” (p. 7, emphases added). An
examining body has a responsibility to sort through which of the
practices that “the confessions call sin” are essential when the
reference is vague. However, when a practice cited in the Book of
Order is “specific” and expressly singled out as a practice that
would necessarily bar a candidate from ordination, then the examining
body has an equal responsibility not “to ignore or waive” that standard
(ibid.). The GAPJC concluded that the “fidelity and chastity” portion of
G-6.0106b, in distinction to the broad reference in the last sentence of
G-6.0106b, is formulated in such a manner as to leave little doubt that
the church deems “conformity [to it] to be necessary or essential” (p.
4).
Thus the GAPJC bases its
decision on the grounds of the specificity of the “fidelity and
chastity” portion of G-6.0106b and its being singled out in the Book
of Order from amongst all other confessional standards, and not
merely on the grounds of a distinction between belief standards and
behavior or practice standards. The GAPJC Bush decision does not
rule out that certain beliefs are also essential, in addition to
behaviors. The GAPJC would undoubtedly concur that the first ordination
vow, which singles out a belief standard (i.e., faith in
Christ as one’s “Savior” and “Lord of all”), is also an essential
ordination requirement. In fact, this belief standard is also explicitly
mentioned in G-6.0106a: officers of the church “should be persons of
strong faith, dedicated discipleship, and love of Jesus Christ as Savior
and Lord.”
The distinction between
“belief” and “behavior” is therefore much less significant for the GAPJC
decision than the distinction between “specific” and “singled out” on
the one hand and “broad” and undifferentiated on the other hand. In
fact, the GAPJC explicitly states that
determinations
“as to whether the candidates for ordination and/or installation have
departed from essentials of Reformed faith and polity. . . . do not rest
on distinguishing ‘belief’ and ‘behavior.’”
Accordingly, since the Achtemeier overture does not address the GAPJC’s
crucial distinction between centuries-old undifferentiated standards in
the Book of Confessions and standards explicitly singled out in
the recent memory of the church for compliance in the Book of Order
from amongst all other “historic confessional standards of the church,”
it does nothing to overturn the GAPJC decision against departures from
the “fidelity and chastity” provision in G-6.0106b.
4. The Overture Dishonestly
Ignores the Singling-Out Effect in G-6.0106b When It Treats the
Sexuality Requirement as Merely “One Among Many Standards”
A fourth problem for the
overture’s validity is that the overture, at least as interpreted by its
own Rationale, is in express violation with the constitutional wording
of G-6.0106b. The Rationale claims that this overture “would restore
[G-6.0106b] to its proper status as one among many standards . . .
applied in case-by-case assessments of fitness” (point 7). Yet the
church through the Book of Order, the polity half of our
Constitution, expressly rejected the premise that this was just “one
among many standards.” G-6.0106a broadly states that the “manner
of life” of officers of the church “should be a demonstration of the
Christian gospel in the church and in the world.” G-6.0106b immediately
follows with a special, explicit singling out of
the “fidelity and chastity”
requirement from “among” all “the historic confessional standards of the
church” as a specific instance of compliance for this “manner of life.”
If it were just “one among many standards” there would have been no
point in the church singling it out for compliance. The church would
have been content to limit its mention to other parts of the
Constitution where it would be merely “one among many standards,” some
of which are essential and some of which are not.
The GAPJC rightly discerned
that in singling out this one standard from amongst all the rest the
church had made its decision to regard conformity to this specific
standard as “necessary or essential” (p. 4). This is so obvious a point
that a reasonable person would have to be deliberately obtuse in order
to deny it. Since “authoritative interpretations” of the Constitution
are supposed to interpret the Constitution, not contradict it, the
Achtemeier proposed A.I. would be invalid if it were to have the
constitutional effect of treating “as one among many standards” a
standard that the Constitution explicitly singles out from amongst all
other standards for the purpose of emphasizing that no departures are to
be permitted. There can also be no doubt that this was the intent of
singling out the sexuality requirement, since the events surrounding its
passage and two subsequent retentions are all in the recent memory of
the church. That intent is clearly communicated in the constitutional
wording of G-6.0106b.
Any attempt on Prof.
Achtemeier’s part, or on the part of others supporting the overture, to
claim that the significance of the Constitution’s singling out the
“fidelity and chastity” provision is unclear would be an instance of
sheer duplicity. Let’s suppose that Prof. Achtemeier were to tell
students at the start of any course that they are obligated to read and
comply with all the requirements of the Seminary’s Student Handbook
that pertain to coursework. Let’s suppose too that he then made a
special point of singling out for specific mention only one rule;
namely, that cheating on an exam or plagiarizing a paper would result in
a failing grade in the course and referral to the faculty for dismissal.
Would the significance of that singling out be unclear to his students?
Would Prof. Achtemeier himself, upon catching a student cheating or
plagiarizing, accept the student’s rationale that the prohibition had
been presented in class only as “one among many standards” in an
undifferentiated Student Handbook, some of which standards are
followed to the letter and some of which are not?
I dare say that Prof.
Achtemeier would regard such reasoning as perverse. Yet when Prof.
Achtemeier, who is a bright person, faces a church that has done
something similar by singling out the “fidelity and chastity” provision
from amongst all other standards, he pretends that the significance of
this is to convey “its proper status as one among many standards” that
are to be decided on a “case-by-case” basis. This reasoning is no less
ridiculous and no less duplicitous than the reasoning of the student in
the example given above, especially when it comes from the mind of an
intelligent person. It is beneath him to argue in this way and leads to
a serious loss of credibility.
5. The
Overture’s Rationale Pretends that the GAPJC Has Acted in an
Unconstitutional and Anti-Presbyterian Manner by Making the “Fidelity
and Chastity” Requirement the “Single Exception” to No Essentials; Yet
the Presbyterian Church Itself through the Constitution Has Singled Out
This and Other Identifiable Essentials
A fifth problem for the
overture’s validity occurs in the Rationale’s related false argument
that by prohibiting departures from the “fidelity and chastity”
provision of G-6.0106b the GAPJC has made one and only one standard
essential, “a single exception,” thereby elevating it “above all other
standards,” a finding that, allegedly, is “contrary to our Constitution,
history, and theology as Presbyterians” (point 6). This argument is
misguided in at least four ways.
In the first place, the GAPJC
Bush decision has not made this the only exception in the
Book of Order. It has referred explicitly to the sexuality
standard in G-6.0106b because this is the one clearly essential standard
that is being contested in some presbyteries. Yet the high court has
established a general principle by which other standards in the Book
of Order could be regarded as essential; namely, “specific”
ordination standards “singled out” by the church to make a special point
about compliance:
[T]he church has required
those who aspire to ordained office to conform their actions ... to
certain standards, in those contexts in which the church has deemed
conformity to be necessary or essential. Section G-6.0106b contains
a provision where conformity is required by church officers “to live
either in fidelity within the covenant of marriage between a man and
a woman (W-4.9001), or in chastity in singleness.” The church has
decided to single out this particular manner of life standard and
require churchwide conformity to it for all ordained church
officers. (pp. 4-5)
In the second place, as the
above citation makes clear, the church itself has made a special
point of “singling out” for necessary compliance this standard. It did
so by way of constitutional amendment when the majority of presbyteries
approved the overture’s wording in 1996-97 and then denied by
ever greater margins vigorous attempts to remove it in 1997-98 and
2001-2002. So it can be hardly be unconstitutional and anti-Presbyterian
to single out a sexual morality standard as essential if the
Constitution itself does exactly that. Achtemeier et al. can wish
that it were not so but the mere act of wishing doesn’t in fact make it
so. Incidentally, this route of amending the Constitution is something
that the PUP Task Force in 2006
was afraid of taking, and Achtemeier is now again afraid of taking,
because they knew then, as he knows now, there is little likelihood that
a majority of presbyteries would approve their “interpretations” of the
Constitution.
It is true that the PCUSA has
been reluctant to draw up a comprehensive list of essentials for
ordination ever since the fundamentalist controversy in the early
twentieth century. Since that time the PCUSA has approached the issue of
essentials more on a need-to-know or as-conflict-arises ad hoc
basis. In other words, when an historic or newly developed essential
comes under attack or questioning, or attempts are made to circumvent
it, the PCUSA has acted to assert its status as essential through
specific reference in the Book of Order. This has been true in at
least three matters, cited below.
In defining particular essentials in the Book of Order
as the need arises, Presbyterians do not wish to imply that there
are no other obvious churchwide essentials. Anyone can think of dozens
of others. Many of them are only implicit but not for that reason any
less essential. We won’t ordain persons who believe that God is in no
way sovereign over anything. We won’t ordain any card-carrying, active
members of the Klu Klux Klan or skinhead Nazi groups. We won’t ordain
any persons who regularly beat their spouse. We won’t ordain any
candidates having regular sexual intercourse with their parent or
sibling, even if the relationship is “committed” and monogamous. On and
on one could go. No reasonable person would seriously argue that any of
these offenses are not violations of implied churchwide essentials or
that candidates who commit them may conceivably have other redeeming
qualities that would offset these offenses. The only reason why the
PCUSA doesn’t explicitly refer to them as essentials in the Book of
Order is because no one seriously contests them as implied
ordination essentials. That they are not defined as identifiable
churchwide essentials has absolutely nothing to do with a reluctance to
define them as such.
In the third place, there are other ordination essentials
in the Book of Order that are clearly identifiable as such,
besides the “fidelity and chastity” provision in G-6.0106b. As I have
argued
elsewhere
these include: the first ordination vow
requiring faith in Christ as one’s “Savior” and “Lord of all” (W-4.4003)
and the affirmation of women’s ordination, which is affirmed in numerous
places and in diverse contexts of the Book of Order.
The very fact that an acknowledgement of Jesus as Savior and Lord is put
in an ordination vow, and the first one at that, so that the candidate
has to swear specific compliance to it, is a clear indicator that this
standard is essential for ordination. Otherwise, what is the point of
requiring someone to swear to it? The fact that the Book of Order
affirms women’s ordination often and in diverse contexts of the Form of
Government and even sets up a committee to insure its continuing
affirmation in the actions of the church is ample indication that this
is being treated as essential.
A person doesn’t have to be Albert
Einstein to figure these things out. It’s a fairly elementary
observation, which is as it should be. One would have to be making a
concerted effort to deny the obvious, likely out of a desire to protect
some other ideological interest, in order to reach any other conclusion.
It is not necessary for the Book of Order to use the explicit
word “essential” for each of these ordination standards. The fact of
locating a specific standard in an ordination vow or oft repeating it in
diverse contexts, as with explicitly singling out a standard for
compliance from amongst all other standards, is tantamount to using the
word “essential,” as any reasonable person knows. To take the example
used earlier, if Prof. Achtemeier were to make his class swear not to
cheat on an exam or plagiarize (“raise your right hand and repeat after
me . . .”) or were to repeat throughout the course of the term the
penalties for cheating or plagiarizing, only a student bent on arriving
at a perverse interpretation could argue that no indicator had been
given that this standard was essential.
In the fourth place, as already
noted, the Achtemeier overture itself makes a huge exception to his
claim that there are no identifiable churchwide ordination essentials in
the Book of Order. In point 6 the Rationale for the overture
states that it is unconstitutional to single out the sexuality standard
as such an essential (cited above). In point 5 its states starkly: “For
any governing body to declare a standard ‘essential’ in the abstract,
for all time and persons, is wholly at odds with the historic practice
and theological commitments of the Presbyterian Church.” Yet in writing
such things he fails to see the blatant contradiction with his assertion
in point 4 that, oh by the way, standards that have to do with
performing constitutional functions remain essential: “An examining body
cannot find a person fit for office unless that person is willing
to perform all of the constitutional functions unique to his or her
office (e.g. a person . . . must be willing and able to administer the
sacraments)” (emphasis added).
One is tempted to ask Achtemeier
et al.: What do you mean by “cannot”? Do you mean “absolutely under no
circumstances”? Or do you mean it in the sense of your interpretations
of the “shall not’s” of the Book of Order, namely, something that
is “binding” but not necessarily a barrier to ordination? Obviously
Achtemeier et al. mean it in the absolute sense, which shows their
inconsistency when it comes to standards in the Book of Order
that they don’t like. Assuming the absolute sense, how then can
Achtemeier et al. possibly claim that the high court has
unconstitutionally made one and only one standard in the Constitution an
ordination essential? Apparently the overture treats being ready and
able to administer the sacraments as another essential and doubtless
would add other functions beyond that one. So the “single exception”
argument is a complete red herring.
6. Contrary to What the Overture Rationale Claims,
Neither G-6.0108 Nor Its 2006 “Authoritative Interpretation” Prohibits a
Determination of Essentials Outside the Context of Examining an
Individual Candidate; Indeed, the Reverse Is the Case
A sixth problem for the
overture’s effectiveness is its claim that neither G-6.0108 nor the 2006
“Authoritative Interpretation” allows for ordination essentials outside
the ad hoc context of ordaining bodies examining individual
candidates for ministry. This claim, which “Covenant Network”
types repeat over and over again as though it were a religious mantra,
was dealt with in my
“GAPJC Scraps Scruples” article
here. Here are five arguments that show why it is untrue.
First, as we have seen in Reason
5, the Book of Order itself provides clear indicators of at least
three identifiable churchwide essentials; namely,
standards that are highlighted for compliance
by being placed in ordination vows (i.e., the affirmation of Christ as
Savior and Lord), standards that are explicitly singled out from amongst
other standards (i.e., the “fidelity and chastity” clause in G-6.0106b),
and standards that are oft-repeated in diverse contexts (i.e., the
affirmation of women’s ordination). The existence of these three clear
indicators within the Book of Order—indeed,
one of these, the singling out of the sexuality standard, occurs just
two paragraphs before G-6.0108—makes it impossible to interpret G-6.0108
as disallowing predetermined ordination essentials in the
Book of Order.
Second,
the Book of Order
requires that those who are to
be ordained must respond with a “yes” to the third constitutional
question of the ordination vows: “Do you sincerely receive and
adopt the essential tenets of the Reformed faith?” (W-4.4003c). The
Achtemeier overture makes this question ludicrous. How can one “receive
and adopt the essential tenets of the Reformed faith” if there are
absolutely no identifiable, predetermined, churchwide
“essential tenets”? How can a candidate for ordained office sign off
to “essential tenets” if these essentials are subject to change with
each and every examination and otherwise cannot be assumed? This
constitutional question about “essential tenets” implies that the
Constitution does possess within its pages some identifiable churchwide
essentials that rise above any ad hoc circumstances.
Third, nothing in the wording of
G-6.0108b precludes a predetermination of one or more essentials in the
Book of Order. G-6.0108b states only that “the decision as to
whether a person has departed from essentials of Reformed faith and
polity is made initially by the individual concerned but ultimately
becomes the responsibility of the governing body in which he or she
serves.” The “ultimately” is stated in
relation to the candidate’s self-determination of essentials, not
the national body’s predetermination through the Book of Order.
G-6.0108b does not say: The decision becomes the
responsibility of the governing body only at the time of the
examination process and without reference to any prior determination of
essentials by the Constitution itself. Nor could it say such a thing
without making a mockery of (a) the clear indicators in the Book of
Order for some predetermined essentials and (b) the
ordination question about receiving and adopting the essential tenets of
the Reformed faith.
G-6.0108b does not even forbid
presbyteries from predetermining essentials in circumstances
where the Book of Order does not provide clear indicators of
essentials (the GAPAC Bush decision erred in arguing otherwise).
If a presbytery wanted to declare, for example, that no one shall be
ordained who is found to be an unrepentant wife-beater (or, in rare
cases, husband-beater), that presbytery has a right to make explicit
what is obviously implicit in the Constitution of the PCUSA.
Technically, G-6.0108b doesn’t
even say that the examining body can determine essentials.
Rather, it affirms only that the examining body has a responsibility to
decide “whether a person had departed from essentials.” The
determination of an essential could already be predetermined in various
ways by the Book of Order itself, as the GAPJC Bush
decision suggests. In that event, the examining body’s job would not be
the determination of essentials but rather more a fact-finding
exploration as to whether the particular candidate has by words or
actions demonstrated noncompliance with the predetermined essential.
Fourth, not even the 2006
Authoritative Interpretation of G-6.0108b, strictly speaking, prohibits
a predetermination of essentials when it states:
Ordaining and installing bodies
. . . have the responsibility to determine . . . whether any departure
constitutes a failure to adhere to the essentials of Reformed faith
and polity under G-6.0108 of the Book of Order, thus barring
the candidate from ordination and/or installation. Whether the
examination and ordination and installation decision comply with the
constitution of the PCUSA . . . is subject to review by higher
governing bodies.
That last sentence—namely that
ordination decisions are “subject to review by higher governing bodies”
to assess compliance with the Constitution—assumes that a prior
determination of essentials is already self-evident in the Book of
Order. If this were not the case—that is, if essentials could
only be determined in the context of ad hoc examinations of
individual candidates—then a higher governing body would not be in a
position to determine that a given ordination or installation decision
violated the Constitution, since there would be no body of identifiable
churchwide essentials independent of the judgment of the examining,
lower-governing body. When the 2006 General Assembly voted to insert
this statement about higher review into the proposed PUP A.I., it did so
against the wishes of the PUP Task Force, which had hoped for total
regional and local autonomy to approve departures from G-6.0106b. The
Task Force didn’t get what it wanted.
Since the Achtemeier overture says nothing about denying higher review,
it is incorrect in its assumption that individual examinations are the
sole venue for determining ordination essentials.
Fifth, the view taken by the
Achtemeier overture is nonsensical on pragmatic grounds. What if several
examinations of candidates have to be conducted in the same day? Should
the examining body do its best to forget whatever it determined as
essentials in the immediately preceding examination? Should it give up
the assumption that failing to believe in Jesus or committing serial
adultery would violate essentials because now it is dealing with the
special circumstances of a new candidate? How would it induce such
memory loss, to say nothing of theological and intellectual suicide, so
that the new candidate could be dealt with in a ‘non-prejudicial’
fashion?
7. The Wording of the Overture, Read Carefully, Does Not
Appear to Accomplish What Its Rationale Says It Will Accomplish
A seventh problem for the
overture’s validity or at least effectiveness is that the wording of the
overture itself, taken independently of the Rationale, does not require
that ordination essentials be determined only on an ad hoc,
case-by-case basis, independent of predetermined essentials in the
Book of Order. Here we can pick up on points already made above.
The first sentence reads:
The requirements of G-6.0108
apply equally to all ordination standards of the Presbyterian Church
(U.S.A.).
This sentence cannot be
interpreted to mean that examining bodies have a right to declare any or
all ordination standards nonessential. (1) The overture itself declares,
in its last sentence, that “the examining body . . . cannot
excuse a candidate’s inability to perform the constitutional
functions unique to his or her office.” So it admits that examining
bodies do not have equal license to allow departures in all
circumstances. (2) G-6.0108 itself makes distinctions in different types
of ordination standards. An examining body is not at liberty to allow
“freedom of conscience” when at issue is a “serious departure from . . .
standards” in the Constitution, an “infring[ment] on the rights and
views of others,” or an “obstruct[ion of] the constitutional governance
of the church.” (3) This statement must be read in light of the
“fidelity and chastity” provision in G-6.0106b just two paragraphs
earlier in the Book of Order, which by its very wording makes the
ordination of violators both a “serious departure from [constitutional]
standards” and an “obstructing [of] the constitutional governance of the
church.” (4) As noted in Reason 6 above, G-6.0108 does not state that
examining bodies can make their determination of departure from
essentials independent of any predetermination of essentials in the
Book of Order. The fact that the 2006 A.I. on G-6.0108 retains the
right of higher review of a lower governing body’s decision makes this
point quite nicely. Given that the Book of Order offers examining
bodies clear indicators of some essential ordination standards, these
indicators cannot be waived or ignored.
The second sentence reads:
G-6.0108 requires examining
bodies to give prayerful and careful consideration, on an
individual, case-by-case basis, to any departure from an ordination
standard in matters of belief or practice that a candidate may
declare during examination.
There is nothing in this
statement that indicates that the examining body is the sole
venue for determining essentials. Indeed, the fact that such decisions
are “subject to review by higher governing bodies” (so the 2006 A.I. on
G-6.0108) proves that they are not the sole venue for such
determinations. Nor is there anything in the statement that says that a
responsibility on the part of the examining body to consider departures
on a “case-by-case basis” grants that body constitutional grounds
for ignoring or circumventing some clear indicators in the Book of
Order regarding what is essential.
Of course, every examining
body should “give prayerful and careful consideration . . . to any
departure from an ordination standard.” If an examining body finds out
that an individual candidate doesn’t believe in Jesus as Savior and
Lord, or thinks Calvin was an agent of Satan, or is currently sleeping
with two other persons concurrently, or expresses the conviction that
all persons of African descent should be denied ordained office, let the
examining body give all the prayerful consideration that it wants to
give. But let not that examining body deceive itself into thinking that
it has any constitutional right, let alone scriptural right, to ordain
such a candidate.
The third and final sentence
reads:
However,
the examining body is not required to accept a departure from
standards, and cannot excuse a candidate’s inability to perform the
constitutional functions unique to his or her office (such as
administration of the sacraments).
The sentence is not without its
problems but a declaration that the examining body is free to ignore
clear indicators of essential ordination standards in the Book of
Order is not one of them.
Although “the examining body is not required to accept a departure from
standards” it is required to be in compliance with the Constitution when
it considers departures. It cannot grant any departure when the Book
of Order signals that the standard in question is essential.
Accordingly, it cannot grant a departure from the requirement that the
candidate acknowledge Christ as Savior and Lord. It cannot grant a
departure when the candidate does not affirm women’s ordination. It
cannot grant a departure if the candidate is engaged in sex outside the
context of “marriage between a man and a woman,” whether that
intercourse involves adultery, polyamory, fornication, homosexual
practice, pedophilia, or bestiality. And, according to the overture
itself, it cannot grant a departure when “a candidate’s inability to
perform the constitutional functions unique to his or her office” is
involved.
In short, there is nothing in the
precise wording of the overture that requires governing bodies to
interpret the overture in the manner prescribed by the Rationale.
Therefore, even if the overture were to pass GA, it wouldn’t necessitate
an overturning of the GAPJC’s key ruling in the Bush case that
departures from the “fidelity and chastity” standard in G-6.0106b are
not permitted examining bodies.
8. The Idea
That an Examining Body Has Carte Blanche to Permit Any Departure From
Ordination Standards Is Supportable Neither from Scripture (Paul) Nor
from Reformed History (Calvin, the Westminster Standards, the Adopting
Act of 1729)
An eighth problem for the
overture’s validity is that the Rationale makes a case based on a
distorted view of Scripture and Reformed history.
a. Paul.
In an instance of bad exegesis of Scripture the overture rationale cites
three texts from Paul (Rom 14:1-13; Gal 5:1-6; Col 2:16-23) that
allegedly elevate the freedom of the individual conscience with respect
to the interpretation of Scripture to a nearly unrestricted sacrosanct
status (“the sacred court”; point 2). In fact, all three texts appear in
a broader context that warns against extending such freedom to the area
of the core gospel and sexual practices. The text in Rom 14:1-13 applies
only to matters of indifference such as diet and calendar, where eating
and drinking can have no affect on one’s standing with the Lord. In the
same letter Paul explicitly rejects the idea that the commission of
sexual immorality, including homosexual practice, is ever a matter of
indifference like diet and calendar issues (1:24-27; 6:15-23, esp. 6:19;
13:11-14). In 6:1-8:17 Paul gives an extended warning against construing
the gospel of grace as a license to live under the control of the sinful
impulse operating in “the flesh.” Later he warns the Gentile believers
in Rome that if they do not continue in God’s kindness they too, along
with the “Israel branches,” will be “cut off” (11:22).
Galatians 5:1-6 occurs in a context where Paul, far from promoting
freedom of conscience with respect to defining the gospel, actually
declares that anyone who adds circumcision to his proclamation will be
“discharged from (the employ or service of) Christ.” Earlier he had
pronounced a curse on anyone who proclaimed a gospel contrary to one
that Paul had proclaimed (1:8-9). Later in ch. 5 he warns the Galatians
against using their newfound freedom as “a staging ground for the
flesh.” If they commit “sexual immorality, uncleanness, licentiousness”
(three terms for sexual offenses that lead off Paul’s vice list) and
other offenses, they “will not inherit the kingdom of God” (5:13,
18-21). One can compare texts in 1 Corinthians where Paul both insists
that unrepentant participants in sexual immorality be put out of the
church—including participants in adult incest, adultery, same-sex
intercourse, sex with prostitutes—and establishes belief in Christ’s
atoning death and resurrection as essential for salvation and inclusion
in the church (5:1-13; 6:9-10; 15:1-4).
Finally, Col 2:16-23, like Rom 14:1-3, speaks only against enforcing
laws having to do with diet, calendar, and contagions. It specifically
rejects any comparison between these practices and matters involving
“sexual immorality, uncleanness, lust, evil desire” (four terms that
focus on sexual offenses), which must be put to death lest God’s wrath
fall on the perpetrators (3:5-6). Ephesians amplifies this point
considerably, stressing that “sexual immorality and uncleanness of any
kind . . . must not even be named among you” in approving terms, let
alone that allowance be made for “departures”; that “no sexually immoral
person or sexually unclean person . . . has any inheritance in the
kingdom of Christ and of God” because “the wrath of God” falls on such;
and that the believers should not even “become associates of theirs,”
despite the exhortations to unity in 4:1-6 (4:17-24; 5:3-12).
The same points can be made about
the Rationale’s use of Eph 4:1-3, Phil 2:3-11, Col 3:12-13, and 2 Tim
2:24-25 to emphasize a “duty of forbearance” (point 3). Paul never would
have applied the principle of “forbearance” to any sexual
intercourse outside of the covenant of marriage between a man and a
woman,
at least not in the sense in which the Rationale applies it (i.e.,
permitting departures from God’s standard for sexual purity).
Forbearance extends only to gentleness and patience in correction, not
to tolerance of the sinful behavior (2 Tim 2:24-25). In cases of severe
sexual immorality, such as incest, adultery, and same-sex intercourse,
persistence in sin is dealt with by temporarily removing the offender
from the fellowship of believers (1 Cor 5; 6:9-10).
b. Calvin and the Westminster Confession of Faith. The
idea that Calvin—we’re talking about Calvin here—would have
supported the view that freedom of conscience meant no identifiable,
absolute, churchwide essentials for ordained officers is so historically
preposterous as to require no other defense than to say simply: read or
reread the Institutes.
The same applies to the
Westminster Confession of Faith. The overture rationale cites a
single line in a lengthy list of things forbidden by the first
commandment, namely, not making “men the lords of our faith and
conscience” (Book of Confessions §7.215). Yet the line is clearly
a reaction against anti-biblical “papist” teaching (alluding to Matt
23:9, which forbids calling any religious figure “father”). It can
hardly be used to justify, as the overture does, the negation of any
identifiable churchwide essentials, especially since atheism and
idolatry are at the top of the list of prohibited offenses. Absolutely
no case can be made for claiming that the Reformers who framed these
standards would have entertained the possibility that an examining body
might in some circumstances legitimately ordain someone who did not
believe in Christ as Savior and Lord or who engaged in sexual
intercourse outside the covenant of marriage between a man and a woman,
especially same-sex intercourse. We’re talking about seventeenth-century
church history here.
For example, the Westminster
Confession states: “the
principal acts of saving faith
are, accepting, receiving, and resting upon Christ alone for
justification, sanctification, and eternal life, by virtue of the
covenant of grace” (Book of Confessions §6.079). The expression
“principle acts of saving faith” is tantamount to saying “essentials of
the faith,” not only for officers of the church but also for
rank-and-file members (similarly, the Shorter Catechism, questions
85-86, §7.085-86). It is historically untenable to pretend this was not
an identifiable churchwide essential “for all time and persons.”
It
would be equally ludicrous to suggest that the Westminster Assembly
extended to any presbytery the option of ordaining someone actively
engaged in same-sex intercourse and adultery. The level of hostility
that any homosexual act would have generated for seventeenth-century
Reformers is simply off the charts. The first series of offenses said to
be forbidden by the seventh commandment against adultery is: “adultery,
fornication, rape, incest, sodomy, and all [other] unnatural lusts,”
using as proof texts for the last two items Rom 1:26-27 on homosexual
practice and Lev 20:15-16 on bestiality (§7.249). Based on knowledge of
the period, the order within this first series probably arises from (1)
putting adultery first because it is explicitly prohibited by the
seventh commandment, not because it is worse than incest, sodomy, and
bestiality; and (2) listing other sexual offenses in the order from
least severe to most severe: fornication; heterosexual, non-incestuous
rape; incest; sodomy; bestiality (similar to Scripture’s ranking).
The idea that the Reformers would have extended to any governing body
the right to declare any of these serial-unrepentant acts non-essential
violations represents the worst form of revisionist history.
c.
The Adopting Act of 1729. Although appeal to the Adopting Act
of 1729 was a major pillar in the PUP Task Force’s Rationale and is
briefly cited again in the Achtemeier overture (point 4), this Act never
established that presbytery examining bodies have carte blanche and sole
autonomy to permit departures from any given standard or
standards by ministers and candidates for ministry. For convenient
online access to the relevant documents go
here; for a brief explanation of the background go
here.
In
the 1729 Act Preliminary to the Adopting Act, the Synod of Philadelphia,
the first synod formed in America (1716) and comprising by 1729 four
presbyteries, received the Westminster Confession of Faith with
the Larger and Shorter Catechisms as “the confession of the church’s
faith.” Current ministers and future candidates for ministry were
required to declare, either by “subscribing”
in writing or by “verbal declaration,” both their “agreement” with and
“approbation” or approval of the Westminster Standards “in all the
essential and necessary articles.” If the minister or candidate for
ministry had “any scruple “in doctrine, worship or government” with
respect to “any article or articles of [the Westminster] Confession or
Catechisms,” he had to state this “to the Presbytery or Synod” “at the
time of” of his declaration of agreement with the Westminster Standards.
“If the Synod or Presbytery” judged the scruple to be about “essential
and necessary articles of faith,” it had to declare him “incapable of
Communion with them.”
In the Adopting Act proper, “all
the Ministers of this Synod” declared that the Westminster Standards
were
the confession of their faith,
excepting only some clauses in the twentieth and twenty-third
chapters, concerning which clauses the Synod do unanimously declare,
that they do not receive those articles in any such sense as to
suppose the civil magistrate hath a controlling power over Synods with
respect to the exercise of their ministerial authority; or power to
persecute any for their religion, or in any sense contrary to the
Protestant succession to the throne of Great Britain. (emphasis added)
In effect, the Synod declared
agreement with the entirety of the Westminster Standards to be essential
and necessary, excepting “only” a particular interpretation of ch. 20,
sec. 4, and ch. 23, sec. 3 that would give the state control over the
synods or “power to persecute any for their religion.”
No scruple with respect to theology proper or ethics was permitted.
Moreover, the decision applied not merely to a single minister in a
single examination but to all the ministers collectively.
Later in 1736 the Synod adopted an “Explanation of the [Adopting] Act”
in which it attempted to reassure those who were concerned for an even
more rigorous subscriptionism by declaring that the Synod “adopted,
and still do adhere to the Westminster Confession, Catechisms, and
Directory, without the least variation or alteration, and without any
regard to said distinctions” between those articles deemed essential
and those not so deemed, excepting “only” certain interpretations
of clauses pertaining to the authority of the state over the church
noted in the Adopting Act of 1729 (emphases added).
In view of the considerable
misrepresentation of the Adopting Act and its Preliminary Act by many in
the PCUSA it is important to make the following points.
First, it was not just the
presbytery that had the power to permit or deny scruples. The synod too
had that power and as such could overrule the presbytery. As there was
no national Presbyterian church at the time in America the “synod” today
would stand for both the national denomination and the provincial synod.
Second, the reference to resolving
scruples at the time of the minister’s or candidate’s declaration was a
restriction on the minister or candidate, designed to prevent candidates
from entering into ministry, or current ministers from continuing in
ministry, on false pretenses. Contrary to the Rationales for both the
PUP Task Force A.I. and (implicitly) the Achtemeier overture, it was
not an insistence that the Westminster Standards in no way
communicated, through various clear indicators, any identifiable,
predetermined, and churchwide essentials of faith. Nor was it an
insistence that essentials were determinable only in the context
of an individual examination or that a determination once made would
apply only to that particular examination. The determination in
1729 of one and only one instance of a valid scruple to the Westminster
Standards was affirmed in 1736 as binding on future candidates.
Third, and following from
the last point, the Synod did not intend by its qualification “in
all the essential and necessary articles” to give examining bodies a
blank check with regard to determining any (or every) article in the
Westminster Standards as nonessential. Only one point was under dispute:
the right of the state to control the synod and thus to punish
offenders. Agreement with everything else in the Westminster Standards
was treated as “essential and necessary” for future candidates. The
issue had always and only been over finer points of Calvinist doctrine
that were contained in voluminous, undifferentiated confessions and
teachings.
The Synod was not allowing presbyteries to accept as ministers persons
who scrupled basic Christian teachings such as belief in Christ as
Savior and Lord, much less to engage in immoral sexual behavior of any
sort.
In short, the Achtemeier
overture provides no credible basis in Scripture and church history for
the extremist proposals that no identifiable churchwide essentials exist
and that “essentials” of the church can only be essentials for a
particular person at a particular time.
9. The Overture Rationale’s
Appeals to Unity as a Basis for Eliminating Identifiable Churchwide
Essentials Are Self-Serving, Irrelevant to Constitutional Obligations,
and Inaccurate
A ninth problem for the overture’s validity is that its Rationale’s
ultimate appeal to unity is unpersuasive and misplaced. The final point
of the Achtemeier overture contends that the unity of the PCUSA can be
maintained only by adopting its peculiar perspective that there are no
identifiable churchwide essentials in the Constitution of the PCUSA or
Scripture (point 7; also point 3). Needless to say, such an argument is
self-serving: Only by agreeing with the view of Achtemeier et al. that
persons should not be refused ordination on the grounds of homosexual
practice can the whole church unite. It is also a bit abusive. Unless
the “Covenant Network,” “More Light” Presbyterians, and others of that
persuasion are allowed to circumvent the clear word of Scripture and the
Constitution of the PCUSA they won’t allow the church to have any peace.
So, they contend, give us what we want and then we will promote
the unity of the church. If they were really in favor of promoting
unity, then they would drop their anti-scriptural and unconstitutional
agenda.
The realities of the past two years also have not verified the claim
that getting rid of identifiable churchwide essentials in the
Constitution will bring peace and unity. This past year has witnessed
increasing conflict in the church, certainly at the presbytery level.
The PUP A.I. has increased court action significantly. The 2008 General
Assembly will continue to be a battleground for this issue. The PCUSA
General Assembly Council has just projected the largest membership loss
in a year since the PCUSA was formed in 1983: nearly 100,000 members
(twice that of the average annual loss since 2002).
A number of churches have left and disputes about property persist. I
see no evidence that the debate on homosexual practice has become less
“polarized” or draws less of the church’s energies. A good case can be
made for the opposite. All that the PUP A.I. has done is bring greater
confusion to the issue of PCUSA policy on homosexual behavior practiced
by candidates for church office and provided a transitional stage for
the full acceptance of homosexual unions among its ordained officers. No
sooner had the GAPJC clarified the whole mess with its Bush
decision than along came the Achtemeier overture to introduce the mess
all over again.
The Achtemeier overture isn’t going to bring more unity to the church.
It is going to lead to the marginalization of the majority within the
PCUSA who faithfully hold to a male-female requirement for marriage.
Furthermore it will make a mockery of the constitutional process by
effectively invalidating three successive actions, by ever-increasing
majorities of the presbyteries from 1997 to 2002, to prohibit in all
circumstances the ordination of anyone who is sexually active outside of
a man-woman marriage. If it would be such a unifying measure to go the
route that Achtemeier et al. propose, let them submit their overture as
a constitutional amendment in order to give the presbyteries throughout
the country a vote. The reason why the overture was brought forward as
an “authoritative interpretation” is that Achtemeier et al. know that
they don’t have the votes nationally to push forward their views. At
most they can only secure approval at the General Assembly level, whose
delegates on the whole are more left-of-center than the rank-and-file of
the church, especially on sexuality issues. The fact that Achtemeier et
al. can’t win on a national vote of presbyteries confirms that his
measure is not the tool for unification that they claim it to be.
The Achtemeier overture plays the unity card in order to distract
attention from the extremist, unscriptural, and unconstitutional
character of its proposal. Whatever Achtemeier et al. believe about
unity and how it is best produced (i.e. by agreeing with them), it can
have no bearing on the question of whether ordaining homosexually active
candidates is scriptural and constitutional. Unity is not a mere
sociological phenomenon. It is first and foremost a christological
concept steeped in fidelity to the teaching of Jesus and the apostolic
witness to that teaching. Unity that is not based on obedience to this,
whether in the area of sexuality or some other area, cannot promote any
kind of unity that is worth preserving. The scriptural case for viewing
a male-female requirement in marriage as foundational is overwhelming.
Nothing to date has been produced by scholars in the PCUSA that makes a
persuasive case otherwise.
As we have shown here, in partial agreement with the GAPJC, the
constitutional case against the Achtemeier overture is also very strong.
Therefore, the unity arguments used in the Achtemeier overture are not
only incorrect but also irrelevant.
10. The Claim That There Are No Essentials of the
Christian Faith “for All Time and Persons” Has the Theologically Insane
Effect of Giving Any Examining Body the Right to Ordain Candidates Who
Deny Even the Most Basic Christian Beliefs and Engage in the Most
Unethical and Immoral Behaviors
A tenth problem for the overture’s validity is that denying the
existence of any identifiable and predetermined churchwide
essentials for ordained office produces theologically absurd outcomes.
We have already noted at the start of this article that such a view
requires the church to concede that examining bodies have a right to
permit departures from the requirement to have faith in Christ as Savior
and Lord or from the prohibition of adultery. To accomplish this all the
examining body needs to do is to declare any constitutional standard of
its choice a nonessential standard. It is as simple as that. If the
claim that there are no ordination essentials that are valid “for all
time and persons” is accepted, then, logically, exceptions should be
permissible for every single explicit and implicit constitutional
standard, up to and including ordaining persons who are not Christians
or persons who are active, unrepentant adulterers or racists. Can anyone
who makes such a claim any longer be taken seriously?
But why stint oneself only to the confession of Christ as Savior and
Lord or sexual fidelity to one’s spouse? There is whole bucketful of
practices and ideas to which one could apply this theological insanity.
An examining body in any individual case, indeed in as many individual
cases as it chooses, would have the option of ordaining a candidate even
if that candidate declared an intent to commit one or more of the
following sexual misbehaviors:
-
Pursue an unchaste sexual relationship
with the church secretary or with the spouses of fellow parishioners.
-
Participate in a sexual “threesome.”
-
Have sex with his or her parent or
sibling, persons of the same sex, prostitutes, or even children and
animals.
By the same token, according to the logic of Achtemeier and the John
Knox Presbytery, a presbytery or session could ordain, and indeed should
have the right to ordain, an individual candidate who declared any or
all of the following beliefs or opinions:
-
God is not sovereign and does not
predestine anything.
-
Salvation is based on human merit and
not on God’s grace.
-
Jesus did not rise from the dead in any
meaningful sense.
-
There is no afterlife for anyone.
-
Jesus did not atone for anyone’s sins.
-
There is no such figure as a “Holy
Spirit.”
-
The idea that anyone is “in Christ” in
any meaningful sense is a crock.
-
Women, persons of African descent, and
the poor are inferior beings.
-
God is a cosmic sadist and masochist.
-
God has no real existence.
So long as candidates go through the motions of performing their
distinct “constitutional functions” like baptizing infants or putting
out the bread and wine for communion, everything is fair game,
regardless of how the Constitution highlights things to make a special
point of compliance. And since there are, allegedly, no identifiable
churchwide essentials for office, the church as a whole could do nothing
about such developments, apart from passing another authoritative
interpretation or a constitutional amendment stating otherwise—something
which Achtemeier et al. do not want to see happen.
Conclusion
At no level does the Achtemeier overture make sense—not theologically,
not constitutionally, and not historically. It is difficult to envision
that such an irresponsible overture could pass the 2008 General
Assembly. However, strange things have happened before at GA so it is
important to get the word out about just how bad and how extremist this
overture is.
One might argue that reciting the first ordination vow (“Do
you trust in Jesus Christ your Savior, acknowledge him Lord of all.
. . .?”) is one of “the constitutional functions unique to his or
her office” so that belief in Christ as one’s Savior and as Lord of
all would be an essential even under the Achtemeier overture.
However, that is unlikely, for two reasons. First, it is
questionable whether taking vows is best described as a
“constitutional function” in the sense of serving the church through
the administration of sacraments. And even if it were, it is not
clear that believing the vows would be a constitutional
function, much less that a change of mind after having once
taken the vow in good faith would be prohibited. The overture is
quite insistent in framing a virtually absolute right to freedom of
conscience and in denying that any standard can be elevated
to an “‘essential’ in the abstract, for all time and persons.”
Secondly, the overture adds the qualifier “unique to his or her
office.” Belief in Christ as Savior and Lord is not unique to
any one office, unlike the “administration of the sacraments,” which
is largely the domain of ministers of the Word and Sacrament (cited
as an example by the overture). The first ordination vow is the same
for deacons, elders, and ministers of the Word and Sacrament.
Indeed, believing in Christ as Savior and Lord is a requirement that
is not even limited to officers of the church. According to
G-5.0100, “one becomes an active member of the church through faith
in Jesus Christ as Savior and acceptance of his Lordship in all of
life.” Therefore, believing in Christ as Savior and Lord would not
qualify under the wording of the overture as an ordination essential
from which departures are not permitted. One can see the absurdity
here of limiting what is essential to that which is “unique to one’s
office.” It is precisely the fact that faith in Christ as Savior and
Lord is required even of all members of the church, not just
leaders, that underscores its foundational, essential character for
officers. Yet the overture would make it just one among many
standards that an examining body may choose to view as nonessential.
It is revealing that both in the overture proper and in the
Rationale Achtemeier cites as his only example of an
inviolable “constitutional function” the “administration of the
sacraments.”