Why Box Turtle
Kincaid Continues to Be Logic-Challenged and Now Also
Principle-Challenged
On the High
Court’s Role in Interpreting the Actions of the 2008 PCUSA General
Assembly regarding Homosexually Active Candidates
by Robert A. J.
Gagnon, Ph.D.
Pittsburgh
Theological Seminary, Pittsburgh, PA 15206-2596
gagnon@pts.edu
Aug. 3, 2008
For
a PDF version with proper pagination and format click
here
“Box Turtle”
blogger Timothy Kincaid continues to live up to the symbol of the box
turtle as an animal that easily loses its way and is challenged by
reality. Kincaid had already misrepresented my logic once about why the
high court of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) can still rule against
governing bodies that ordain homosexually active candidates, despite the
2008 General Assembly “Authoritative Interpretation” on ordination
standards (“Gagnon
Employs Tortured Logic,” July 5). Now he has misrepresented it yet
again in his rejoinder on Aug. 2 (“Clarifying
Robert Gagnon's Tortured Logic”) to my July 30 response (“Is
Box Turtle Kincaid Logic-Challenged?”).
Kincaid has no choice but to acknowledge that he
“misstated” my argument in his previous posting,
and has to admit, “in a
very exacting sense, Gagnon is correct.” Then Kincaid’s confusion really
goes to work.
I. Kincaid’s Confusion and
the PCUSA High Court’s 2008 Bush Decision: Who has the “tortured
logic”?
Kincaid attempts to show that I have a skewed
understanding of the 2008 General Assembly “Authoritative
Interpretation” (A.I.) of the Book of Order clause dealing with
the extent of “freedom of conscience” allowed candidates or officers of
the church (G-6.0108). However, instead of citing the wording of that
A.I. or even its non-binding rationale, he cites a non-binding
“Advisory Opinion” of the Stated Clerk’s office concerning the
2006 A.I. on G-6.0108. Apparently Kincaid didn’t
realize that the 217th General Assembly was in 2006, not
2008. The 2006 A.I. is similar to the 2008 A.I.; indeed, the 2008 A.I.
begins by “affirm[ing]
the authoritative interpretation of G-6.0108 approved by the 217th
General Assembly (2006).” Nevertheless, the 2008 A.I. is distinct from
the 2006 A.I. If Kincaid, a person who constantly bullies others for not
getting their facts straight, can’t even get this fact correct, what
does this level of carelessness say about his credibility?
The non-binding character of the Advisory Opinion by
the Stated Clerk’s Office that Kincaid cites is underscored by the fact
that in early 2008 the PCUSA high court, the General Assembly Permanent
Judicial Commission (GAPJC), disagreed with the Stated Clerk’s opinion
by ruling unanimously in its
Bush decision:
It would be
an obstruction of constitutional governance to permit examining bodies
to ignore or waive a specific standard that has been adopted by the
whole church, such as the ‘fidelity and chastity’ portion of G-6.0106b,
or any other similarly specific provision.
(pp. 4-5, 7;
for detailed discussion of this
decision go
here)
In other words, governing bodies do not have the right to
ordain homosexually active candidates in direct violation of a specific
provision of the Constitution. The “fidelity and chastity” portion of
G-6.0106b specifies that “among” “the historic confessional standards of
the church” to which candidates for ordained office must conform is
the requirement to live either in
fidelity within the covenant of marriage between a man and a woman ...
or chastity in singleness.
So the Stated Clerk’s Office was wrong. As the high
court noted, the 2006 General Assembly did not approve the rationale
of the 2006 A.I., which did interpret the A.I. as permitting
homosexually active candidates to be ordained. It approved rather the
text of the A.I. itself. And to that text the 2006 General Assembly
added a qualifying amendment; namely, that “higher governing bodies”
such as the GAPJC have the right to “review” any action by a lower
governing body, to test not just “whether the ordaining/ installing body
has conducted its examination reasonably, responsibly, prayerfully, and
deliberately” (which remained from the original overture) but, more
importantly, “whether the examination and
installation decision comply with the constitution of the PCUSA.”
The “Peace, Unity and Purity” Task Force that had proposed the
“Authoritative Interpretation” opposed this addition, as did
homosexualist commissioners, but it passed in spite of their opposition.
Their resistance to the addition underscores the fact that they knew its
passage would have negative ramifications for their “local license”
scheme.
The
implication of the addition was that if a governing body ordained a
person who did not comply with a specific ordination requirement, such
as the “fidelity and chastity” requirement in G-6.0106b, higher
governing bodies such as the GAPJC would have the right to reverse the
decision. The presbytery and local session are thus not the final
arbiters for determining a candidate’s compliance with essentials,
contrary to what the supporters of the 2006 A.I. wanted and what the
supporters of the new 2008 A.I. want. There must be identifiable,
churchwide ordination essentials; otherwise there would be no point to
granting higher governing bodies the right to review decisions for
compliance with the Constitution.
Was
this 2008 ruling by the GAPJC a plot by a rightwing-dominated,
“homophobic” court? No, the GAPJC is widely acknowledged as being
composed mostly of persons who support the blessing of homosexual unions
and the ordination of homosexually active candidates. Yet they had the
integrity and good sense to recognize that an “Authoritative
Interpretation” cannot change the
Book of Order
(the polity half of
the PCUSA Constitution, the other half being the
Book of Confessions).
It can only “interpret” the Book of Order. A specific ordination
requirement in the
Book of Order—explicitly
singled out from among all other “historical confessional standards of
the church” no less—cannot be violated by
any
governing body at any
time. To do so would be, in the words of the very clause of the
Book of Order
that the 2006 A.I. was suppose to interpret, “to obstruct
the constitutional governance of the church” (G-6.0108a).
Kincaid calls this reasoning adopted by me and by the mostly
left-of-center high court “tortured logic.” As it is, the “tortured
logic” belongs entirely to Kincaid and the ideologues in the “Peace,
Unity and Purity” Task Force who think now, and thought then, that a
mere “authoritative interpretation” passed by a General Assembly can
overrule the clear wording of a constitutional amendment passed and
repeatedly reaffirmed by the presbyteries of the PCUSA in ever
increasing margins in 1996-97, 1998-99, and 2001-2002. “Tortured logic”
is when someone claims, as the writers of the 2006 A.I. did and later
the writers of the 2008 A.I., that an ordination requirement in the
Constitution (the
Book of Order)
explicitly singled out from among all “the historical confessional
standards of the church” for the obvious purpose of stressing
compliance—in other words, of all the ordination requirements this one
we want governing bodies to make a special point of keeping—is not a
necessary barrier to ordination when violated.
II. Why
the Text of the 2008 General Assembly A.I. on Ordination Requirements
Need Not, and Should Not, Be Interpreted to Permit the Ordination of
Homosexually Active Candidates
Now
let’s turn to the wording of the new 2008 A.I. on G-6.0108 (the John
Knox Overture) whose formulators wrote with the design of overturning
the 2008 GAPJC
Bush
decision.
The A.I. consists of 4 sentences:
[1] The 218th General Assembly
(2008) affirms the authoritative interpretation of G-6.0108 approved by
the 217th General Assembly (2006).
[2] Further, the 218th General
Assembly (2008), pursuant to G-13.0112, interprets the requirements of
G-6.0108 to apply equally to all ordination standards of the
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.).
[3] Section G-6.0108 requires
examining bodies to give prayerful and careful consideration, on an
individual, case-by-case basis, to any departure from an ordination
standard in matters of belief or practice that a candidate may declare
during examination.
[4] However, the examining
body is not required to accept a departure from standards, and cannot
excuse a candidate’s inability to perform the constitutional functions
unique to his or her office (such as administration of the sacraments).
In
the month or two between the time that this overture was passed and the
2008 General Assembly convened, I put online a detailed
critique of the John Knox Overture that pointed out a series of
internal contradictions, absurdities, and other problems with the
overture and its attached rationale. Had the authors and advocates for
that overture taken the time to read my critique they might have made
the appropriate changes to make the overture workable. But they didn’t
do so. Consequently they are stuck with an essentially untenable A.I.
that cannot achieve what they wanted to achieve.
Now
where in the text of this A.I. does it state that a governing body can
ordain homosexually active candidates in violation of the specific
constitutional requirement in the
Book of Order
(G-6.0106b)? Nowhere that I can see. Nor could it have
constitutionally done so. Let’s look at the individual elements.
1.
The first sentence:
affirming the 2006 A.I. with its “higher review” clause.
The first sentence
states that the 2006 A.I. is still in place. Ironically the
homosexualist-leaning Advisory Committee on the Constitution (ACC)
suggested this revision at the 2008 General Assembly. Its effect is the
opposite of what the ACC intended. Affirmation of the 2006 A.I. means,
per the amendment added to that A.I. at the 2006 General Assembly
regarding higher review and per the 2008
Bush
decision of the GAPJC
(see above), that
higher governing bodies
like the GAPJC have the right to overturn the ordination decisions of
lowering governing bodies that do not comply with specific ordination
requirements in the Book of Order.
The very concept of higher review for constitutional compliance
presupposes that there are identifiable, churchwide ordination
essentials—a consequence that guts the rationale for the A.I. (which
presumed that there were no such identifiable essentials to which all
sessions and presbyteries were bound). The wording of the 2006 A.I. does
not collapse review for constitutional compliance into mere technical
reviews to confirm that the examination was done “reasonably,
responsibly, prayerfully.” The 2006 A.I. clearly distinguishes these two
types of review and affirms both.
2.
The second sentence:
applying the requirements of G-6.0108 equally (not all ordination
requirements are equal).
The second line says, “the
requirements of G-6.0108 apply equally to all ordination standards of
the Presbyterian Church.” Contrary to what the authors of the A.I. want,
this cannot be read to say that “all ordination standards carry equal
(non-binding) weight.”
(a) The last line of this A.I. itself makes clear that not all
ordination standards are equal. It explicitly states that an examining
body “cannot excuse a candidate’s inability to perform the
constitutional functions unique to his or her office (such as
administration of the sacraments).” So, then, not all ordination
standards are equal. Governing bodies have no leeway to ordain a
candidate that cannot fulfill constitutional functions.
(b) The very portion of the Book of Order that this A.I.
purports to “interpret” (G-6.0108) denies any assumption that all
ordination standards are equally non-binding. It states explicitly
that allowable freedom of conscience to dissent on the part of
candidates and officers cannot extend to actions “obstructing the
constitutional governance of the church.” Persons have some allowable
freedom of conscience with respect to belief, though even this is
limited (for example, one cannot be ordained who does not confess Christ
as Savior and Lord in accordance with the first ordination vow).
However, they do not have the right to obstruct the church’s governance
by refusing to comply with a Book of Order (i.e. polity)
provision. For example, officers are allowed to believe that
homosexually active candidates should be entitled to ordination. But
they are not allowed to participate in the ordination of candidates who
are homosexually active because that kind of action would clearly
constitute an obstruction of the church’s constitutional governance.
(c) The idea that there are no identifiable churchwide
essentials whose violation serves as necessary barriers to ordination
leads to absurdities. It would entitle governing bodies to ordain
persons who were active and unrepentantly involved in adultery or sexual
unions involving three or more persons; who refused to confess Jesus
Christ as Savior and Lord in accordance with the first ordination vow
and the historic faith of the church; and who refused to ordain women.
Therefore it cannot be seriously taken to mean that a governing body has
a right to ordain candidates no matter how far they stray from the
requirements of the Book of Order.
For these three reasons (a, b, c) the second line of the 2008 A.I.
cannot reasonably mean anything more than that ordaining bodies must
enforce equally diligently all the different requirements in G-6.0108
that pertain to who can and cannot be ordained. It cannot mean that
there are no ordination requirements to which all candidates for office
in the PCUSA are bound to comply—at least not without contradicting
itself, the very article of the Constitution that it interprets, and
common sense.
3.
The third sentence: Examine candidates prayerful on a case-by-case
basis.
Nothing in the remaining two sentences of the 2008 A.I. specifies that
governing bodies have the right to violate a specific polity provision
of the Book of Order governing ordination, and indeed could not,
for that would result in “obstructing the constitutional governance of
the church,” in violation of G-6.0108. Neither praying during the
examination process nor examining candidates “on an individual,
case-by-case basis”—both specified by the third sentence of the 2008 A.I.—entitles
an examining body to ordain a candidate in clear violation of a specific
ordination requirement, least of all one that is explicitly singled out
in the Book of Order from among the historic confessional
standards of the church like the “fidelity and chastity” clause of
G-6.0106b.
4.
The fourth sentence: Not required to accept departures and cannot
excuse an inability to perform constitutional functions.
The statement that “the
examining body is
not required
to accept
a departure from standards”—so
the fourth sentence of the A.I.—is
not
the same as saying
that an examining body is
not required to deny
a departure from a specific, mandated ordination requirement that would
“obstruct the constitutional governance of the church.” An examining
body is not required to accept the latter type of departure but it
is required to
reject it.
Nor does the statement deny the right of a “higher governing body” such
as the GAPJC to overturn a lower governing body’s decision to allow such
a departure.
As
noted above, the last clause about the examining committee not being
permitted to ordain candidates who cannot perform constitutional
functions in effect defines such functions as identifiable, churchwide
ordination essentials. This in turn means that, contrary to what the
rationale states, identifiable churchwide essentials exist. Therefore,
applying G-6.0108 “equally to all ordination standards” cannot mean that
all ordination standards are equal, unless all ordination standards are
essential requirements that cannot be violated. Moreover, the last line
indicates that these churchwide essentials include, but are not
necessarily limited to, matters of polity and governance. Ordaining
homosexually active candidates or other violators of specific ordination
requirements would constitute an inability to carry out the
constitutional function of ordaining only candidates who comply with the
ordination requirements of the
Book of Order.
In conclusion, not only is there nothing in the
actual wording of the 2008 Authoritative Interpretation of G-6.0108 that
allows governing bodies to ordain candidates who are homosexually active
in clear violation of a specific ordination requirement in G-6.0106b of
the
Book of Order
but also there are elements both within the A.I. itself and in the
portion of the
Book of Order
that it purports to interpret (G-6.0108) that positively forbid such a
construal (to say nothing of common sense). It would be “tortured
logic,” to use Kincaid’s own words, to arrive at any other conclusion.
III. Why We Don’t Know What the
Majority
of Commissioners at the 2008 General
Assembly Intended regarding Ordination of Homosexually Active Candidates
Kincaid is left with sour grapes. He says: “Gagnon
knows full well…. that it was the intention of the General Assembly to
allow those local bodies who wish to ordain gay or lesbian Presbyterians
the freedom to do so.” This is a false statement. How do I know how each
and every member of the General Assembly interpreted the words of the
2008 A.I.?
I can surmise that the authors of the overture and
its vocal advocates had such an intention; and even that most of those
voting for it had such an intention. At the same time this A.I. passed
by a relatively small margin,
375 to 325 (with four
abstentions), 53% to 46%. Had only 25 out of 704 commissioners, a mere
3.5%, voted for the overture without realizing that it would allow
governing bodies to ordain anyone irrespective of what degree he or she
violated the ordination requirements of the Book of Order or to
what degree he or she obstructed the constitutional governance of the
church, and irrespective of any right to higher judicial review for
constitutional compliance, then Kincaid’s claim would not be true.
I was both a commissioner and an overture advocate
in the 2006 General Assembly and I was an overture advocate again in the
2008 General Assembly. I saw at both Assemblies a lot of confused
commissioners—commissioners who were confused even when the overture up
for a vote was clear. In the case of the John Knox Overture that became
the 2008 A.I. on G-6.0108, the wording was very oblique and
contradictory, especially if one attempted to interpret it along the
lines of the rationale that accompanied the overture. If so interpreted
it would lead to absurd results like giving governing bodies the right
to ordain persons who didn’t even believe in Jesus or who were actively
engaged in adultery or polyamory. Furthermore, the fact that the
overture was revised in the final days of the Assembly to “affirm
the authoritative
interpretation of G-6.0108 approved by the 217th General Assembly
(2006)”
could only have added to the confusion since that A.I.
specifies the right to higher review for constitutional compliance,
which presupposes that lower governing bodies do not have the right to
ordain candidates in violation of national ordination requirements.
Confirmation of this confusion became apparent to me
in the Church Orders Committee, where the overture had to be approved
before going on to the plenary for a final vote. When I made the
observation to the committee that approving this overture would mean
that there would no longer be any identifiable churchwide
essentials for ordination, not even for faith in Christ or fidelity in
marriage, I got many puzzled and confused looks. And yet that is exactly
what the rationale claimed when it said: “For
any governing body to declare a standard ‘essential’ in the abstract,
for all time and persons, is wholly at odds with the historic practice
and theological commitments of the Presbyterian Church” (point 5). Pure
and simple: There are no ordination essentials “for all times and
persons.” Even though the overture advocate (Prof. Mark Achtemeier of
Dubuque Seminary) made that (absurd) point in his speech to the
committee, many did not pick up on it (I suspect precisely because it
was such an unbelievable idea). Without such a premise the text of the
overture could not make enforcement of the sexuality standard in
G-6.0106b optional, since the text nowhere specifies or singles out the
sexuality standard. With such a premise, however, one is led to absurd
results like the possibility of ordaining non-Christians, adulterers,
and polyamorists; contradiction with the overture’s own claim that
candidates have to at least be able to perform constitutional functions;
and contradiction with the provision of the Constitution that the
overture was suppose to “interpret” (G-6.0108, which expressly forbids
ordinations that obstruct the church’s constitutional governance).
Either way, whether one accepted the outrageous premise of the rationale
or did not believe that such a premise was being made, the situation was
extremely confusing.
So, no, I honestly do not “know full well” that the
majority of the commissioners at the 2008 General Assembly intended the
passage of the A.I. to mean that governing bodies could circumvent the
clear mandate of the sexuality standard in the Constitution. (And
Kincaid who wasn’t there, who can’t even find the right A.I. to discuss,
and who has little or no knowledge of the PCUSA process knows much less
than I do.) In fact, I’m inclined to believe that more than 25
commissioners who voted for the overture were dreadfully confused
when they did so. Any fair reading of the text of the overture will
indicate how obliquely its message is put.
That is why the PCUSA courts, and especially the
high court (the GAPJC), cannot be bound by the rationale that
accompanies the overture but is not actually voted on by the General
Assembly. It is impossible to know, especially in a close Assembly vote
like this one with a text that does not harmonize well with its
rationale and which was revised midway through the Assembly proceedings,
whether the majority of commissioners who voted for the overture did so
in full agreement with the overture’s rationale.
Kincaid insinuates that I am somehow disingenuous in
asserting that the rationale for the Authoritative Interpretation
carries no authoritative status. What he doesn’t seem to realize, or
care to realize, is that this is not my rule. It is the rule of
the Presbyterian Church. It has been a rule that liberals have operated
with for years, attempting to interpret the “fidelity and chastity”
clause in G-6.0106b in ways that ran absolutely counter to that
overture’s original rationale. Classic examples have been: Princeton
Seminary Prof. George Hunsinger’s well-known argument that “chastity in
singleness” in G-6.0106b could include a homosexual relationship, even
though G-6.0106b sets it in an either-or contrast with living “in
fidelity within the covenant of marriage between a man and a woman”; and
the efforts by members of the “Peace, Unity, and Purity” Task Force, the
Advisory Committee on the Constitution, and other homosexualist forces
to argue that violation of the “fidelity and chastity” clause in
G-6.0106b was not a necessary barrier to ordination, even though the
authors of this amendment and its rationale and the various governing
bodies that successively voted for it clearly believed and stated
otherwise. The only reason why the high court, the GAPJC, has not bought
this leftwing argument about G-6.0106b over the years is that the
wording of the fidelity and chastity clause was sufficiently clear, even
without its non-binding rationale, to make attempts to circumvent it
look unreasonable. The same cannot be said of the confusing text of the
2008 A.I. on G-6.0108, as I have shown here.
IV. Why Kincaid Is Not Only Logic-Challenged But Also
Principle-Challenged
The really disingenuous part of Kincaid’s article
begins when he chastises “so many religious anti-gays” (the nomenclature
that he uses for people like me) for allegedly “car[ing] little about
the Spirit of the Gospel,” “quickly discard[ing] grace and replac[ing]
it with legalism.”
Kincaid is the same guy who has recently chastised me for
my opposition to a retranslation of
the Heidelberg Catechism because, Kincaid alleges, I
allowed my “homophobia [to] trump the written witness” (here).
Because the 1962 English translators reinserted a reference to
“homosexual perversion” and several other vices that the original German
authors of the Catechism left out from their clear reference to 1 Cor
6:9-10, Kincaid is outraged that I would not agree that a retranslation
is necessary. He completely ignores the fact that there are no
historical grounds whatsoever for concluding that the original authors
left out the reference to homosexual practice because they had some
disagreement (or lack of understanding) regarding Paul’s indictment of
homosexual practice in 1 Cor 6:9. Kincaid completely ignores the fact
that all the evidence indicates that reference to homosexual offenders
was left out because it would have scandalized 16th century
children for whom the Catechism became a central resource for
instruction. In short, he completely ignores the fact that it is against
the spirit of the text of the Catechism to initiate a long process in
the PCUSA to remove two words from the 1962 translation for the express
purpose of attempting to normalize the very behavior whose mention was
excised in the Catechism precisely because of the abhorrence with which
it was viewed. What is that but a form of textual legalism on Kincaid’s
part, utilized when it serves his homosexualist interests? (For a fuller
response go
here.)
Kincaid also operates with a concept of Spirit
and grace alien to the New Testament witness. He seems to believe,
falsely, that the Spirit and grace empower radical deviation from,
rather than radical obedience to, commands of Scripture that are
consistently, strongly, absolutely, and counterculturally maintained.
Paul would disagree totally: “Sin shall not exercise lordship over you
for you are not under law but under grace” (Rom 6:14; in context
referring to how the believer no longer lives in conformity to the
sinful desires in one’s members). Nowhere is there any suggestion in
Scripture, understood in its literary and historical context, that a
male-female prerequisite for a valid sexual union was a matter of
relative indifference to the authors of Scripture. One might just as
well call retention of Scripture’s prohibition of man-mother or
man-sister intercourse in cases where the relationship is adult,
committed, and loving evidence of legalism.
Even more disingenuous is Kincaid’s contention that
“Gagnon’s position is that language technicalities are the means by
which the court should ignore the intention of the Assembly,” implying
that Kincaid himself has some sort of inherent aversion to looking
for “loopholes” in texts. Kincaid is happy to tell others that there
are valid loopholes in Scripture’s clear and absolute opposition to
homosexual practice. He and other homosexualists on this score have been
about nothing if not arguing for loopholes on the basis of alleged
technicalities and contending that certain texts in their historical and
literary context are unclear when the arguments for such claims are weak
indeed.
The entire effort by homosexualists who have
advocated for the “authoritative interpretations” of 2006 and 2008 to
permit homosexually active candidates to be ordained in spite of a
strong constitutional prohibition in G-6.0106b has been about looking
for loopholes through technicalities, but this seems not to bother
Kincaid because his overall argument here is unprincipled. Kincaid does
not regard the principle of searching for loopholes through
technicalities as bad per se. For he apparently likes such a strategy
when it serves his homosexualist interests. It is only when such a
strategy comes back to bite him that he is opposed to it.
The “fidelity and chastity” clause in the Book
of Order (G-6.0106b) is quite clear about the point that homosexual
behavior is absolutely forbidden to officers of the church.
1. The singling out effect in G-6.0106b
as evidence for the essential status of the “fidelity and chastity”
clause. The very mode of expression in G-6.0106b makes it
obvious that having sex outside “the covenant of marriage between a man
and a woman” would violate an ordination essential. The text explicitly
singles out from “among” “the historic confessions of the church” “the
requirement to live either in fidelity within the covenant of marriage
between a man and a woman … or chastity in singleness.” Now what would
be the point of singling out this standard from among all others if not
to highlight: “This one we really want you to abide by”? If the church
had not intended some special significance to be given to this
ordination requirement, if it had intended that some openness be given
to ordaining homosexually active candidates, why did it bother to single
out this requirement from among others? If it had not added this clause
to the Book of Order homosexually active candidates would have
stood a much better chance of being ordained.
Obviously, then, the requirement was added to make the prohibition of
homosexual practice and other sexual offenses absolutely binding on all
officers and candidates for office.
The attempt to pass an “authoritative interpretation”
which pretends that noncompliance with G-6.0106b is not a necessary
barrier to ordination, that the “singling out” effect does not convey
any essential character to the requirement, goes beyond a search for
loopholes and technicalities to an outright lie about the text. There is
no one who doesn’t understand the point of the singling out. Suppose a
professor begins a course by telling students:
You are responsible for reading the
specific requirements for this course in the syllabus and the general
requirements in the student handbook. However, among all the rules for
this course I want to make special mention of one: If you cheat on an
exam or plagiarize a paper you will fail this course and be subject to
the school’s disciplinary hearings, which may lead to your expulsion. So
don’t even think about doing it.
Is there any student who, after hearing this, could
reasonably argue that the rule about not cheating or plagiarizing was
not necessarily binding? Obviously not. Yet that is precisely what the
authors and strong supporters of the 2008 A.I. are arguing.
2. There can be no doubt that it was
the intention of the majority of the church from 1996 to 2002 to insert
into the Constitution, and retain therein, the policy that unrepentant
homosexual practice was a necessary barrier to ordination. The
history of the “fidelity and chastity” clause—how it came into the
Constitution (Book of Order) and was twice reaffirmed by national
presbytery votes—demonstrates clearly that it was the intention of the
clear majority of the presbyteries not to allow knowingly any
ordinations of homosexually active candidates.
In 1996 the General
Assembly approved by a 57% margin G-6.0106b, known at the time as
“Amendment B,” and the presbyteries went on to ratify it in 1997 by a
vote of 97-74-1 (56.4% for, 43% against). In 1997 the GA reversed
itself, voting to change the language of G-6.0106b so that it would not
limit sexual activity to a man-woman marriage. Yet presbyteries rejected
the attempt to gut G-6.0106b and did so by a significantly greater
margin than they had approved G-6.0106b only one year earlier: 114-59
(65.9% against deletion of G-6.0106b, 34% for). In 2001 the GA voted for
an amendment to delete G-6.0106b and did so by a landslide vote of
317-208 (60.4% for, 39.6% against). Once again the presbyteries defeated
the attempt to nullify G-6.0106b. This time they more than reversed the
GA percentages with a whopping 125-46-1 vote by the presbyteries against
the proposed amendment (72.7% against, 26.7% for). A lesson here is that
General Assembly votes on sexuality have become increasingly
unrepresentative of the will of most Presbyterians.
Every time that a vote on the “fidelity and
chastity” provision took place, it was crystal-clear to both sides what
the vote was about: whether to allow any ordinations of
unrepentant, homosexually active candidates. Those who voted to affirm
and reaffirm the “fidelity and chastity” provision in the Constitution
over a period of six years did so with the understanding that it would
make unconstitutional the ordination of any persons who engaged in
practicing, self-affirming homosexual behavior. I never met, or read of,
a single person who at the time when he or she voted in favor of the
“fidelity and chastity” provision thought that the provision gave each
and every examining body the discretion to ordain homosexually active
candidates. Not one.
The high court (GAPJC) has also affirmed this
interpretation of G-6.0106b in a series of decisions over the last
decade. For example, in the 2000
Londonderry case the GAPJC ruled that the sessions of Christ
Church Presbyterian in Burlington, VT and Mid-Coast Church in Topsham,
ME could not ordain to office persons involved in homosexual
relationships because to do so
“exceeds the constitutional bounds of
freedom of conscience” (citing G-6.0108a). “There are no constitutional
grounds for a governing body to fail to comply with an express provision
of the Constitution, however inartfully stated.” Governing bodies must
“comply with the express corporate judgment of the Church in an explicit
constitutional provision” such as the “fidelity and chastity” provision
in G-6.0106b.
Now if Kincaid were such a sincere stickler for not
circumventing the national will of official Presbyterian votes through
appeal to technicalities and loopholes, why wouldn’t he view any
interpretation of the new 2008 A.I. that attempted to subvert the clear
constitutional intention of the Presbyteries as constitutionally
invalid? The apparent answer: Although Kincaid pretends to be basing his
view on a principle—namely, that the intention behind a
denomination-wide decision be heeded even if the wording of the decision
does not technically establish the intention—he really operates on an
unprincipled basis. For when the principle suits his ideological fancy
he adopts it but when it runs counter to his objectives he dispenses
with it. Nor can Kincaid legitimately argue that the high court should
respect both the intention behind the constitutional provision
for sexual behavior in G-6.0106b and the intention behind the
2008 Authoritative Interpretation. For these two intentions are
diametrically opposed—one absolutely forbids the ordination of persons
engaged in homosexual practice, the other permits governing bodies to
ordain homosexually active candidates on a case-by-case basis.
Nor does Kincaid have a principled choice to pick
the intention behind the 2008 Authoritative Interpretation over the
intention behind the sexuality standard in G-6.0106b.
At several levels it is not possible to compare the two national votes
as equal.
(a) Most importantly, as regards their level of
constitutional authority there is no comparison. For a
constitutional provision takes precedence over any “authoritative
interpretation” that purports to interpret it but in effect attempts to
change it. Changing the constitution requires not only approval of the
General Assembly but also ratification by the majority of the
presbyteries nationwide. It cannot be done by stealth; that is, by
attempting constitutional change in the guise of an “authoritative
interpretation.” It doesn’t matter that the 2008 Authoritative
Interpretation is a more recent vote than the votes ratifying and
retaining the “fidelity and chastity” provision in G-6.0106b, inasmuch
as only an amendment to the Constitution can change the
Constitution, not an authoritative interpretation.
(b) As regards the clarity of the text at hand
the two cannot be compared. The wording of the “fidelity and chastity”
clause of G-6.0106b is quite straightforward in declaring that
candidates cannot be ordained who do not confine their sexual
intercourse to “the covenant of marriage between a man and a woman.”
Yet, as we have seen above, the same degree of clarity cannot be said
for the wording of the 2008 Authoritative Interpretation, which is quite
oblique (it never even mentions anything about sexual practice).
Moreover, as noted above, an interpretation of the 2008 A.I. which
presumes that there are no identifiable churchwide ordination essentials
is in conflict with the last clause of the A.I. itself, and with
the very provision of the Book of Order that it purports to
interpret, and with common sense (for it is absurd to argue that,
in a connectional church like the Presbyterian Church, a presbytery or a
session has the right to allow a scruple on any or every part of the
Book of Order). In short, the wording of one text (G-6.0106b) is
relatively clear and transparent while the wording of the other (the
2008 A.I.) is relatively unclear and contradictory.
(c) As regards the strength of support for the
text there is no contest. On the one hand, the 2008 A.I. was
approved by only a narrow vote, and that only of the General Assembly,
where it is far from clear that the majority of persons voting believed
that they were saying that there were no identifiable, churchwide
ordination-essentials in the Book of Order, including the
specific sexuality standard in G-6.0106b. On the other hand, the
“fidelity and chastity” provision in G-6.0106b was approved and
reaffirmed by a series of significantly larger majorities (the last time
by a nearly three-quarters vote), and that not merely by a relatively
small group of commissioners attending General Assembly but by a
supermajority of the presbyteries nationwide. The strength of the
support, as well as the series of votes nationally over a period of six
years, speak to the clarity of the intention, for it is not likely that
so many people over so long a period of time (and with so clear a text)
were confused about what they were voting on.
So if Kincaid wanted to act in a principled matter
on this issue he would have to insist that any interpretation of
the 2008 Authoritative Interpretation of G-6.0108 that attempts to allow
the ordination of homosexually active candidates in violation of the
“fidelity and chastity” clause in G-6.0106b is unconstitutional and thus
impermissible. But Kincaid has no wish to do this because doing so does
not serve his homosexualist agenda. In this he shows himself to be not
only logic-challenged but also principle-challenged. By what logic does
Kincaid propose to insist on respect for the intention behind the 2008
A.I. while utterly disregarding the clearer, stronger, and more
authoritative intention behind the “fidelity and chastity” requirement
in G-6.0106b? To use Kincaid’s own words about me, only an
“excruciatingly tortured” logic.
To argue, as many homosexualists do, that because
G-6.0106b does not explicitly call the “fidelity and chastity” clause in
G-6.0106b an “essential” ordination requirement but ‘only’ (!) singles
out this “requirement” from “among” all the other “historic confessional
standards of the church” as something to which all candidates must
conform is (again to use Kincaid’s own words directed at me) a classic
example of “caring little about the spirit and instead looking for jots
and tittles,” “quickly discarding grace and replacing it with legalism,”
and arguing that “language technicalities are the means by which [a
General Assembly] should ignore the intention of [successive, nationwide
votes of the presbyteries].”
Kincaid closes by comparing my views to that of
“obstinate children who look for loopholes in their parents’ wording,”
for example by saying, “I know Mom said to stop hitting you, but she
didn’t write it down.” This is, once again, a misrepresentation of my
views. My view is not merely that the 2008 A.I. did not use the word
“homosexual,” as Kincaid claims. My view is that the promoters of the
2008 A.I. produced a text that is so oblique, so convoluted, and so
contradictory in relation to itself and in relation to the Constitution
that it purports to interpret that construing it as permission to ordain
homosexually active candidates should be rejected by the high court as
unconstitutional and thus an incorrect construal of the A.I.
In Kincaid’s own illustration it is more accurate to
say that he and other homosexualist ideologues are the obstinate
children who refuse to take Mom’s original statement at face value (=
the “fidelity and chastity” clause in the Book of Order) but
instead attempt to “interpret” it in transparently contradictory ways (=
the rationale attached to the 2008 A.I.) and then blame Mom for not
taking at face value their own contradictory “interpretation.” It is
difficult to convey the whole messed-up situation regarding the 2008 A.I.
in a parent-child dialogue but at least part of it would look like this:
Mom
to son: “I want to single out, among all the rules that I want you to
obey, this one in particular: Don’t ever hit your little sister. Your
father and I will handle the discipline here, not you. If you violate
this rule you won’t be able to go on the camping trip with your Dad this
weekend.”
Son
walks off to deliberate: “I don’t think that Mom meant this rule to be
more important than any other rule. You know, she also says that my
bedtime is 9 PM but sometimes I get to stay up till 9:30 or even 10. So
she must mean that I need to decide for myself on a case-by-case basis
when I can hit my little sister.”
Son hits little sister. Little sister
tells Dad.
Dad
to son: “I don’t think, son, that we can go on that camping trip this
weekend.”
Son:
“But, Daaaaad, I was really looking forward to it. You promised.”
Dad:
“Sorry, son, but I promised to take you if you obeyed your mother. While
we don’t expect perfection, you broke an essential rule.”
Son:
“But, Daaaaad, she never used the precise word essential’ or
added no exceptions.”
Dad:
“And she also never said that there were no other exceptions to my
promise. More than one person can play that, game, son.”
Mom
didn’t have to use the word “essential.” She conveyed the rule’s
essential character by singling it out for special mention for the
obvious purpose of stressing compliance. The same holds for the
limitation of sexual relations by candidates and officers to “the
covenant of marriage between a man and a woman” in G-6.0106b.
Non-compliance with the plain meaning
of language and refusal to heed semantic cues to meaning lead to a
betrayal of common trust.
Hopefully the GA Permanent Judicial Commission will not take shelter
under the unprincipled defense “we only take intention as determinative
for meaning when it serves our interests to do so.” Hopefully the GAPJC
will start with the intention behind the singled-out “fidelity and
chastity” requirement in the Book of Order (G-6.0106b) and from
there rule against every attempt to change the Constitution under the
false guise of an “authoritative interpretation.”